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ABSTRACT 
 
Outsourcing and Wage Inequality in the Home Country. (May 2007) 
Kuang-Chung Hsu, B.S., National Chung-Hsing University; 
M.S., National Taiwan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Donald Deere 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays, which mainly talk about the wage 
inequality caused by outsourcing in the source countries like the US. The title of the first 
essay is “Does Outsourcing Always Benefit Skilled Labor? A Dynamic Product Cycle 
Model Approach.” To understand why outsourcing did not cause wage inequality in the 
1970s, I build a dynamic product cycle model with three kinds of labor inputs, scientists, 
white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers. First, only a homogenous representative 
producer exists in the model and then the paper allows for producer heterogeneity. 
According to my theoretical model, outsourcing can hurt skilled labor and does not 
cause wage inequality if outsourcing industries are absolutely blue-collar 
worker-intensive compared to non-outsourcing industries. Only scientists who conduct 
research and development always benefit from outsourcing.  
The second essay is an empirical work. The title is “Outsourcing, Innovation, and 
Wage Inequality in the United States: What Happened to the Outsourcing Effect on 
Wage Inequality in the 1970s?” I find that, in the 1970s, white-collar workers’ wages 
deteriorated and blue-collar workers’ wages were non-decreasing. R&D workers always 
benefit from outsourcing. Except computers and high-technology capital, innovation 
expenditure on wage payment was an additional source of wage inequality in the 1980s.  
The last essay is named “Beyond the Wage Inequality, the Impact of Outsourcing 
on the U.S. Labor Market.” To understand the impact of outsourcing on employment, I 
examine laborers’ ages, gender ratio, years of education, and job tenure and retention 
rates. By employing the January Current Population Survey (CPS) data, the National 
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Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) production data, and outsourcing data provided 
by Feenstra and Hanson, I find that outsourcing decreased blue-collar laborers’ average 
years of completed education; increased the hiring of females into white-collar workers, 
and increased job stability of unskilled and skilled laborers in the 1980s. Thus, 
outsourcing did not take away unskilled laborers’ jobs but hindered new hiring of young 
unskilled workers 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The topic of whether outsourcing contributes to wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled labor in industrialized countries has received a great deal of attention from 
economists. Theoretical speaking, the idea that outsourcing contributes to wage 
inequality is well supported by previous literatures such as Feenstra and Hanson (1997), 
Glass and Saggi (2001), and Sayek and Sener (2006). Empirical papers, such as Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999) also find that outsourcing can 
explain the increase in the relative wage of skilled workers. 
However, some of Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) results are unexpected. In 
1972-1979, outsourcing had a statistically insignificant negative effect on the wage share 
of non-production workers. Consistent with theoretical models, in the 1980s the 
coefficient of outsourcing was statistically significant and positive. According to Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996), outsourcing had expanded dramatically in both the 1970s and 
1980s.1 Therefore, the growth rate of outsourcing was not the reason for the divergence 
from theoretical predictions. The empirical results in the 1970s became another puzzle to 
economists.  
To solve the puzzle in the 1970s, this dissertation uses three papers to analysis this 
topic. In the first paper, I employ a general equilibrium model to find an explanation to 
the puzzle. There will be three labor forces and two types of industries in this model. 
Then, in the second paper, several regressions are employed to test my theoretical 
predictions. The last paper discusses this topic by analyzing the change of inflows and 
outflows in employment. By examining the average age, years of completed education, 
tenure, and retention rate and gender-ratio, the results can let me understand the impacts 
of outsourcing on employment clearly.         
As the discussion above, this dissertation has five chapters. The second chapter is 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the American Economic Review.  
1 The annual change of outsourcing in 1972-1990 was 0.331 and in 1979-1990 was 0.313. Please see 
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for details. 
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entitled as “Does Outsourcing Always Benefit Skilled Labor? A Dynamic Product Cycle 
Model Approach.” The title of Chapter III is “Outsourcing, Innovation, and Wage 
Inequality in the United States: What Happened to the Outsourcing Effect on Wage 
Inequality in the 1970s?” The fourth chapter is entitled as Beyond the Wage Inequality, 
the Impact of Outsourcing on the U.S. Labor Market.” Conclusion is presented in 
Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II 
DOES OUTSOURCING ALWAYS BENEFIT SKILLED LABOR? 
A DYNAMIC PRODUCT CYCLE MODEL APPROACH 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The issue of whether outsourcing contributes to wage inequality between skilled 
and unskilled labor in industrialized countries has received a great deal of attention from 
economists. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) build a model with one final good, which is 
assembled from a continuum of intermediate inputs to analyze this issue. They find that 
outsourcing shifts production of intermediate inputs from a developed country to a 
developing country and reduces demand of unskilled labor in the developed country.2  
Glass and Saggi (2001) extend the quality ladders and product cycles model by 
considering outsourcing and find that increased outsourcing fuels the rate of innovation 
and lowers the relative wage of labor. Sayek and Sener (2006), also based on the quality 
ladders and product cycles model, considers two kinds of labor and substitution between 
them. After an increase in outsourcing, their model shows that the relative wage of 
skilled labor will increase unambiguously. The idea that outsourcing contributes to wage 
inequality is well supported theoretically.  
Empirical papers, such as Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Slaughter (1995), 
argue that outsourcing can explain little of the change in wages, but Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996) argue these findings are due to the narrow measure of outsourcing. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) employ a new measure of outsourcing computed as a fraction of imports of 
intermediate inputs in total consumption in each industry and find that outsourcing 
accounts for 30.9 % of the change of the non-production wage share. Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999) employ a two-stage regression to estimate the relative effects that outsourcing and 
expenditures on high-tech capital had on wages in the United States from 1979-1990. 
They find that outsourcing explains 15% of the increase in the relative wage of 
                                                 
2 In their finding, outsourcing also causes a increase in relative demand of skilled labor in a developing 
country. Please see Feenstra and Hanson (1997) for details. 
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non-production workers. 
However, some of Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) results are unexpected. In 
1972-1979, outsourcing had a statistically insignificant negative effect on the wage share 
of non-production workers. Consistent with theoretical models, in the 1980s the 
coefficient of outsourcing was statistically significant and positive. According to Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996), outsourcing had expanded dramatically in both the 1970s and 1980s. 
Therefore, the growth rate of outsourcing was not the reason for the divergence from 
theoretical predictions. The empirical results in the 1970s became another puzzle to 
economists.  
In most previous theoretical work, outsourcing means that producers outsource the 
basic part of production to low wage countries to reduce costs. If a basic part of 
production also requires skilled labor, outsourcing may not only affect unskilled 
laborers’ jobs, but skilled workers’ jobs as well. According to Glass and Saggi (2001), 
outsourcing increases a firm’s profit, which leads to increased expenditures on Research 
and Development (R&D). Skilled laborers who conduct R&D will benefit from 
outsourcing. Mixing those R&D workers with other types of skilled workers may 
generate a misleading conclusion.   
The types of industries that outsource can also play an important role in the impact 
on relative wage. If outsourcing industries are unskilled labor-intensive compared to 
non-outsourcing industries, outsourcing will cause a decrease in domestic labor demand 
for unskilled workers. However, outsourcing can also increase the profit of firms in the 
industries, which may increase the demand of unskilled and skilled labor. These two 
opposing effects determine the impact of outsourcing on the relative wage of skilled 
labor.      
The keys to the puzzle of the 1970s could be the differences between outsourcing 
industries and non-outsourcing industries and differences in types of skilled labor. In this 
study, I construct two theoretical general equilibrium North-South models with 
innovation, imitation, and outsourcing. Unlike previous works of Glass and Saggi (2001), 
and Sayek and Sener (2006), both models have three kinds of labor inputs (scientists, 
  
5
white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers) to distinguish the different effects of 
outsourcing on different types of skilled workers. The second model also allows industry 
heterogeneity to explore the impacts of outsourcing for different types of industries.  
The two theoretical models are presented in section II. Both models have three 
kinds of workers and the second model is allowed to have heterogeneous producers to 
examine its impact on wage inequality. Section III verifies the theoretical predictions by 
employing United States manufacturing industry data from 1972 to 1992. Section IV 
presents conclusions.  
 
2.2 The Model  
There are two countries, the North (N) and the South (S), each with a 
representative consumer and a continuum of industries. There are many firms in each 
industry. Firms attempt to develop better quality products to earn higher profits. To 
produce products and invent new generations of products, firms need to hire labor. There 
are three kinds of labor, white-collar workers (W), blue-collar workers (B), and scientists 
(H). Developing higher quality level products, firms need to conduct R&D, which needs 
scientists that exist only in the North. When a firm in the North invents a new generation 
product and wins the innovation competition in the North, it becomes a Northern Firm. 
The North, compared to the South, is abundant in white-collar workers relative to 
blue-collar workers. Firms in the North can attempt to outsource part of their production 
to the South by adapting their production technology. If a Northern Firm successfully 
outsources its part of production to the South, it becomes an Outsourcing Firm. Although 
there are no scientists in the South, Southern Firms can adopt new technologies by 
imitating Outsourcing Firms. Once the state-of-the-art technology fully leaks to the 
South, it becomes old generation technology and Southern Firms are able to produce it. 
Therefore, Southern Firms either produce part of the North’s outsourced production or 
old generation products.  
This study starts with only one type of producer. Using this simple specification, 
the model shows us that skilled labor can be hurt by outsourcing. Then, I add an 
  
6
additional type of producer to analyze the impact of outsourcing on wage levels of all 
kinds of workers in a more complete way. The results of the model with industry 
heterogeneity tell us that outsourcing affects labor differently when labor intensity varies 
between the two types of industries. This result explains why the impact of outsourcing 
on wage inequality in the 1970s is different from the 1980s. 
 
2.2.1 Homogenous Producers 
2.2.1.1 Consumer  
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Glass and Saggi (2001), consumers 
who live in one of two countries choose commodities available in discrete quality levels 
indexed by m  from a continuous number of industries indexed by j. The representative 
consumer in country i  has intertemporal preferences given by lifetime utility    
(1)    ( ) ,log
0∫∞ −= dttueU iti ρ                    SNifor , = ,             
 
where ρ  is the subjective discount rate, and instantaneous utility of each consumer is 
 
(2)    ( ) ( ) djtjxtu
m
im
m
i  ,loglog
1
0
∫ ∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= λ           ,, SNifor =               
 
where ( )tjxim ,  is the quantity of commodities demanded by consumers in country i of 
quality level m  of industry j at time t . λ , which is greater than one, represents the 
size of quality improvement, and mλ is the assessment of quality level m . Thus, 
consumers are willing to pay a premium of λ for a one quality level improvement in a 
good. 
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 The decision of the representative consumer is to maximize lifetime utility, 
equation (1), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
 
(3)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫∞ ∞ −− +≤0 00 dttYeAdttEe tRtR ,                                                
 
where ( ) ( )dssrtR t∫= 0  is the cumulative interest rate and ( )0A  is the aggregate value 
of assets held in time zero.  Aggregate labor income, ( )tY , is  
 
(4)    ( ) ( )∑ ∑
= =
=
SNi BWHk
k
i
k
i twLtY
, ,,
,                                                            
 
where ( )twki is the k  type labor’s wage in country i at time t and kiL  is the k type 
labor supply in country i . Aggregate spending of the world, ( )tE , is 
 
(5)    ( ) ( ) ( ) djtjxtjptE
m
mm  ,,
1
0
∫ ∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ,                                                      
 
where ( )tjpm ,  and ( )tjxm , are the price and product demand of quality level m of 
industry j at time t . Since all consumers are willing to pay a premium λ  for one 
increment of quality level, ( ) ),( , 1 tjptjp mm −= λ  for all products. According to the 
definitions above, the consumers’ maximization procedure first allocates lifetime wealth 
across time evenly. Then, they equally apportion expenditures across products at each 
instant. Meanwhile, they allocate all their spending for each product at each instant to 
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the highest quality level available.3    
 
2.2.1.2 Producer  
The North producer’s problem has three stages: innovating a new product, 
producing it, and outsourcing it. In the first stage, innovation races occur simultaneously 
among all firms in the North. Let Hw  represent the wage rate of scientists. Firms in the 
North undertake innovation intensity r  for a time interval .dt  This requires 
rdtar units of scientists at a cost of rdtaw r
H
N , where ra represents the labor 
requirement per innovation intensity. The probability of successful innovation is .rdt  
Note that ra  is a function of 
Hw and, since scientists are the only input in R&D, I 
assume that its demand elasticity is inelasticity. 4  To ensure a finite intensity of 
innovation, expected gains from innovation are required not to exceed costs of 
innovation 
 
(6)    ≤NV ( )HrH waw               with equality whenever r > 0,                          
 
NV is the market value of an industry-leading Northern Firm that does not outsource part 
of its production to the South. In the equilibrium, this condition holds with equality.      
 Once a firm in the North is successful in the innovation race, it begins the second 
stage, production. Let BN
W
N
N www = , represent Northern relative wage of white-collar. 
The unit cost of a Northern Firm is 
                                                 
3 See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Glass and Saggi (2001) for details of the consumer’s 
maximization problem. 
4 One can think of capital as the other input in conducting R&D, and firms can purchase capital at a given 
price. When Hw  increases, enterprisers can substitute capital for scientists. However, since scientists are 
still the main factor in R&D, an increase in Hw still increases total expenditures of R&D. Adding capital 
in this model yields the same results. 
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(7)    ( ) ( ) ,BNNNBWNNNWN wwawwaC +=                                                    
 
where NC is the unit cost of a Northern Firm that does not outsource their part of 
production. NWa and NBa are the white and blue-collar workers’ unit labor requirements 
of Northern Firms. Note that 0<∂∂ NNW wa  and 0>∂∂ NNB wa .   
With an exogenous probabilityφ , Northern Firms can outsource part of their 
production to the South successfully and become Outsourcing Firms. The final good 
then combines inputs produced in the North with inputs outsourced to the South. The 
exogenously determined North and South input mixes are denoted α  and α−1  
respectively, where 10 << α . The unit cost for Outsourcing Firms is 
 
(8)    ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]        ,    1 BSSSBWSSSWBNNNBWNNNWO wwawwawwawwaC +++−= αα                    
  
where SWa and SBa  are Southern white and blue-collar workers’ unit labor 
requirements of Outsourcing Firms in the South. BS
W
S
S www = , is the relative wage of 
white-collar workers in the South and 0<∂∂ SSWj wa  and 0>∂∂ SSBj wa . Southern 
Firms’ unit cost of production is normalized to one as the numeraire good 
  
(9)    SC ≡ ( ) ( ) 1=+ BSSSBWSSSW wwawwa .                                                  
 
This normalization makes the product price of Northern Firms’ goodsλ , the premium 
for quality, and the quantity of output is λEx = . Ifδ = ,1 λ  a Northern Firm makes 
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instantaneous profit  
 
(10)    ( )EC NN δπ −= 1 .                                                                
 
An Outsourcing Firm’s instantaneous profits are  
 
(11)    ( )EC OO δπ −= 1 .                                                                
 
Furthermore, the reward of a Northern Firm for success in an innovation race is  
  
(12)    
( )
r
V
V
ON
N
++
+= φρ
φπ
,                                                              
 
where OV is market value of an Outsourcing Firm. The OV is    
 
(13)    
r
V
O
O
++= μρ
π
,                                                                
 
where μ  is an exogenous probability that Southern Firms can fully imitate the 
state-of-the -art technology. By assuming Southern Firms face perfect competition, their 
profit are zero, .0=Sπ     
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2.2.1.3 Industry Flows and Labor Markets 
Let ,Nn  On , and Sn  denote the fractions of Northern Firms, Outsourcing Firms, 
and Southern Firms. Note that 1=++ SON nnn . In the steady-state equilibrium, industry 
fractions remain constant. That means the flows in must the equal flows out of each type 
of industry. First, Northern Firms capture production from Southern Firms and they 
successfully become Outsourcing Firms with a given probabilityφ   
 
(14)    NS nrn φ= .                                                                     
 
With exogenous probability, Southern Firms fully learn the state-of-the-art technology 
and force Outsourcing Firms out of market. The fraction of Outsourcing Firms also 
needs to remain constant, which implies      
 
(15)    ON nn μφ = .                                                                    
 
In the Northern labor market, the fixed supply of scientists, HNL , must equal the 
labor demand for innovation department in equilibrium  
 
(16)    ( ) HNHrS Lrwan = .                                            LH     
 
I named equation (16) LH, which is used to solve the equilibrium values of Hw and WNw . 
Since WNw  has no effect in equation (16) if 
Nw is fixed, LH is a horizontal line in a 
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graph with Hw and WNw  as its coordinates’ axes.
5 The equilibrium in the white-collar 
labor market requires that the fixed supply of white-collar workers in the North and 
South ( WNL  and 
W
SL ) is equal to the demand by Northern Firms, Outsourcing Firms, and 
Southern Firms.  
 
(17)    ( ) ( )[ ] WNONWNNNWN LEnwanwa =−+ δα )1(                                             
 
(18)    ( ) ( ) WSSWSSOSWS LEwanEnwa =+δα .                                                
 
 The fixed supply of blue-collar workers in the North and South ( BNL  and 
B
SL ) must 
equal the demand by Northern Firms and Outsourcing Firms in the North, and 
Outsourcing Firms and Southern Firms in the South  
 
(19)    ( ) ( )[ ] BNONBNNNBN LEnwanwa =−+ δα )1( ,                                             
 
(20)    ( ) ( ) BSSBSSOSBS LEwanEnwa =+δα .                                                  
 
Note that since I focuse on the North, I simplify the settings in the South. The unit labor 
requirements for white-collar and blue-collar workers of Outsourcing Firms in the South 
are the same as those of Southern Firms.     
 
 
                                                 
5Under a given WNw , equation (16) can solve equilibrium value of .
Hw  
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2.2.1.4 Steady-State Equilibrium  
Equations (14) and (15), and 1=++ SNO nnn  can be used to derive the 
following fractions 
 
(21)    ( )φμφμ
φ
++= r
rnO  , ( )φμφμ
μ
++= r
rn N , ( )φμφμ
φμ
++= rn
S .   
                            
Solving equations (17), (18), (19), and (20) provides solutions of innovation intensity 
r for any labor market combination between the North and South in four terms. They are 
 
(22)     ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]WNWSWSWNWSWN
W
N
W
SSN
LL LaLaLa
Lawwr W
S
W
N +−+=− αφφμδ
φτμφα ,,;, ,  
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]BNBSBSBNBSBN
B
N
B
SSN
LL LaLaLa
Lawwr B
S
B
N +−+=− αφφμδ
φτμφα ,,;, , 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]WNBSBSWNBSWN
W
N
B
SSN
LL LaLaLa
Lawwr B
S
W
N +−+=− αφφμδ
φτμφα ,,;, , and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]BNWSWSBNWSBN
B
N
W
SSN
LL LaLaLa
Lawwr W
S
B
N +−+=− αφφμδ
φτμφα ,,;, .                            
 
In equation (22),α  has a positive relationship with innovation intensity, r , and μ  has 
a negative relationship with innovation intensity. This result forα  is consistent with 
Glass and Saggi (2001), but differs from Sayek and Sener (2006) who argueα has no 
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effect on r . The intuition behind this result is that by increasing outsourcing, 
Outsourcing Firms gain more profit, which leads to increased expenditures on R&D to 
augment the probability of inventing a state-of–the-art technology in the next generation. 
However, the higher level ofμ  means Outsourcing Firms have a higher risk of losing 
their leadership and their profit, which motivates them to reduce their R&D. After 
solving for ,r  the solution of aggregate spending for the world is 
 
(23)    ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]φμφμαφμμφα ++−+= −11,,;, ra LwwE WN
W
NSN ,                                 
 
where rE ∂∂ < 0, and α∂∂E < 0.  
 To find the solutions of two endogenous variables, Nw  and Sw , one can pick 
two solutions from (22) and set them equal to each other. To avoid using any of the labor 
market restrictions twice, I use W
S
W
N LL
r −  and BSBN LLr −  to derive equation (24) and BSWN LLr −  
and W
S
B
N LL
r −  to derive equation (25).  
 
(24)    
( ) ( )( ) ( ) BSNBNSWS
W
S
NW
N
SB
S
BBWW
B
N
W
N
Lwawa
Lwawa
L
L =
−
,                                                     
 
(25)    
( ) ( )( ) ( ) WSNBNSBS
B
S
NW
N
SW
S
BWWB
B
N
W
N
Lwawa
Lwawa
L
L =
−
,                                                     
 
Equation (24) shows a positive relationship between Nw  and Sw , and equation (25) 
implies a negative relationship between Nw  and Sw . The intersection of these two 
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equations determines the equilibrium level of Nw  and Sw . Figure 1 illustrates the 
equilibrium level of *Nw and *Sw , the relative wage of white-collar workers in the North 
and South.6 Note thatα ,φ , and μ have no effect on *Nw and *Sw . The intuition 
behind equations (24) and (25) is that, although outsourcing reduces both Northern 
white-collar and blue-collar workers’ labor demand, it does not change the hiring ratio of 
white-collar and blue-collar labor. The relative wage of white-collar workers in the 
North and South is still determined by the labor endowment of these two countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relative Wages of White-Collar Workers in the North and the South 
 
After determining the equilibrium level of the relative wage of white-collar 
workers, I use them to solve the equilibrium levels of ( )*** , SN wwE , ( )*** , SN wwr  in 
equation(22) and (23). *E , *r , and unit cost equations (7) and (8) are used to rewrite 
equation (6) as   
 
                                                 
6 I add “*” on endogenous variables to represent equilibrium values.  
Nw  
Sw
*Nw  
0 
BBWW−
BWWB−
*Sw
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(26)     
( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) ( )HrH
W
N
ON
waw
rr
wCCrErE =++++
+++−+++
φρρμ
φρμδφρμ
**
******
,  HW     
 
where *NC = ( ) WNNN wwC *  and *OC = ( )( ) WNNO wwC α−* , which are functions of *Nw . 
Equation (26) indicates a negative relationship between Hw  and WNw  for a given
*Nw . 
The intuition behind equation (26) is that under a fixed *Nw , an increasing WNw  will lead 
to increased production costs. Since firms have less profit, they will reduce R&D and 
their demand for scientists. The equilibrium wages of scientists and white-collar workers 
are shown in Figure 2. The equilibrium occurs at the wage level where equation (16), the 
labor market condition of scientists, is equal to equation (26).7 The equilibrium wage of 
blue-collar workers, *BNw , is then
** NW
N ww .    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Northern Wages of Scientists and White-Collar Workers 
                                                 
7 Also, the procedure of determining equilibrium values of Hw  and WNw  first uses equation (16) to 
settle Hw , then by a given Hw , uses equation (26) to solve WNw .  
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*E , *r , *Nw , *Sw , *Hw , *BNw , and
*W
Nw are now solved. Using 
*r in equation (21) 
yields the equilibrium fraction of Northern Firms, Outsourcing Firms, and Southern 
Firms *Nn , *On , and *Sn , respectively. To determine equilibrium wages in the South, one 
can use the numeraire equation (9), which implies a negative relationship between WSw  
and BSw , combinined with the definition of relative wage in the South, 
*Sw = BS
W
S ww . 
The intersection in Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium wage levels in the South, *WSw  
and *BSw . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Southern Wages of White-Collar Workers and Blue-Collar Workers  
 
 
B
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2.2.1.5 Comparative Static Analysis       
What will happen if Outsourcing Firms decide to increase the fraction of 
production they outsource to the South?  First, when α  increases, according to 
equations (24) and (25), it will not affect the relative wage of white-collar workers in the 
North and South. However, the increasingα  has a positive effect on r  and leads to 
increased Nn and On ,  but decreased E and Sn . In figure 2 the LH line, which represents 
the labor market of scientists will shift up since r Sn is equivalent toμ On , which is 
increasing, and only an increase in Hw can balance equation (16). As for HW line, which 
represents the balance between innovation and production, increasingα  decreases both 
its intercept and slope. Therefore, in Figure 2 the equilibrium will move from point A to 
point B, which definitely yields a higher Hw  and a lower WNw . This means that, if there 
is an increase in outsourcing, the wages of scientists will increase and the wages of 
white-collar and blue-collar workers in the North will fall. As for Southern workers, 
since the relative wage of white-collar workers in the South does not change, the wage 
levels of both white-collar and blue-collar workers remain constant. 
Define the extent of international outsourcing as the fraction of all production 
outsourced to the South, Onαχ ≡ . The extent of international outsourcing, χ , will 
increase certainly because both α and On are increasing On .  
 
Proposition 1. An increase in the outsourcing fraction of production will increase the 
wages of scientists. Although the relative wage of white-collar workers remains constant, 
outsourcing decreases the wage level of white-collar and blue-collar workers in the 
North. The extent of international outsourcing will certainly increase. 
 
 
 
  
19
2.2.2 Heterogeneous Producers 
2.2.2.1 Producer Behavior 
In section 2.1, I only allowed for one type of industry. In this section, by allowing 
for two types of industries, industry heterogeneity is added. However, only firms in type 
1 industries can outsource part of their production to the South. Type 2 industries can not 
outsource production. By assuming Southern Firms can only access the state-of-the-art 
technology of products by Outsourcing Firms in the South, Southern Firms can only 
imitate type 1 industries. Although Southern Firms can only access the state-of-the-art 
products from type 1 industries, they are still aware of the technology of old generation 
products from both types of industries. After relaxing the homogenous restriction on 
producers, some assumptions also need to be changed to allow us to focus on the 
difference between these two kinds of producers. First, the unit labor requirement of 
innovation is no longer a function of Hw . Labor demand of scientists now depends on 
the decision of R&D intensity in these two types of industries. Second, in the last section, 
outsourcing means firms in the North outsource part of their production to the South. In 
this section, outsourcing means firms outsource their basic part of production to the 
South. This implies that outsourcing makes Outsourcing Firms concentrate on 
skilled-labor-intensive production. Last, for focusing on the difference of labor usage 
between different industry types, this study assumes the price elasticity of substitution of 
white-collar workers and blue-collar workers between industries are the same. That 
means NWNW aa '2
'
1 =  and NBNB aa '2'1 = .  
Under this heterogeneous setting, the benefits and costs of innovation become  
 
(27)     rl
H
N
N
l awV ≤        with equality whenever r > 0 &  l  = 1, 2,                         
 
where NlV is the market value of an industry-leading Northern Firm in type l  
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industries and rla  is the unit labor requirement for R&D of type l  industries. The unit 
cost of an industry-leading Northern Firm is 
 
(28)    ( ) ( ) 2 ,1&  10          =<<+= lawwawwaC NlBNNNBlWNNNWlNl                              
 
where NlC is the unit cost of type l  industry Northern Firms that do not outsource their 
basic part of production. NWla and
NB
la are the white and blue-collar workers unit labor 
requirements of type l industries.  
Northern Firms in type 1 industries can outsource their basic part of production to 
the South. The exogenous probability a firm is successful in outsourcing is φ  as in 
2.1.2. By denoting the exogenous proportionsα  and α−1 , the unit cost of an 
Outsourcing Firm is8 
 
(29)    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      , ] [  ];;[1 111 BSSSBWSSSWBNNOBWNNOWO wwawwawwawwaC +++−= αααα                    
  
where OWa1 and
OBa1 are the unit labor requirements of white and blue-collar workers by 
Outsourcing Firms in type 1 industries. α , in the function of unit labor requirements, is 
to illustrate the fact that outsourcing makes firms concentrate on producing the advanced 
part of production, which is skilled-labor-insensitive. Therefore, α∂∂ OWa1 > 0 and 
α∂∂ OBa1 < 0. Again, Southern Firms’ unit cost of production is equation (9), which is 
employed as the numeraire and normalized to one. The Northern Firms that yield 
instantaneous profits  
                                                 
8 For simplification, I assume that the firms in industry 1 use the same way they produce advanced 
production to produce basic production before they become outsourcing firms. The reason is that the 
adjusting process costs a lot and they know they will outsource their basic production sooner or later.         
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(30)    ( )EAC NlNl δπ −= 1      l= 1, 2,                                                    
 
where Nlπ is the profits of Northern Firms in type l  industries. Outsourcing Firms in 
type 1 industries yield the instantaneous profits 
 
(31)    ( )EAC OO δπ 11 1−= .                                                              
 
For type 1 industries, the reward of a Northern Firm that is successful in the innovation 
race is  
  
(32)    
( )
1
11
1 r
VV
ON
N
++
+= φρ
φπ .                                                               
 
OV1 is market value of a Northern Firm in type 1 industries that successfully outsource 
their basic part of production to the South. It is     
 
(33)    μρ
π
++= 1
1
1 r
V
O
O .                                                                
 
For industry 2, the reward of a Northern Firm that is successful in the innovation race is  
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(34)    
2
2
2 r
V
N
N
+= ρ
π .                                                                   
 
2.2.2.2 Industry Flows and Labor Markets 
Assume 1n  and 2n  denote two fractions of type 1 and type 2 industries and the 
sum of 1n  + 2n +
Sn  is one. Letting Nn  represent Northern Firms in type 1 industries 
and On  denote Outsourcing Firms in type 1 industries, the total fractions constraint 
is On + Nn + 2n +
Sn = 1. For simplicity, 2n  is fixed, but 1n  and 
Sn  remain endogenous. 
In the steady state, for the fraction of both Northern and Outsourcing Firms to remain 
constant, the inflow of Northern Firms or Outsourcing Firms in type 1 industries must be 
equal to the outflow in type 1 industries. Since Northern Firms capture production from 
Southern Firms at a rate Snr1 and transfer into Outsourcing Firms at a rate 
Nnφ , 
equation (14) now becomes 
 
(35)    NS nnr φ=1                                                                      
 
and equation (15) remains the same. 
The supply of scientists equals the demand for R&D departments across firms in 
each industry. That is,  
 
(36)    HN
rrS Lranran =+ 22211 .                                                             
 
The fixed supply of Northern white-collar and blue-collar workers equals the demand of 
production of two industries, including Northern and Outsourcing Firms  
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(37)    ( ) ( ) ( ) WNONOWNNNWNNW LEnwanwanwa =−++ δα ])1([ 1122                                
 
(38)    ( ) ( ) ( ) BNONOBNNNBNNB LEnwanwanwa =−++ δα ])1([ 1122 .                                
 
The labor market in the South is the same as in equations (18) and (20).  
 
2.2.2.3 Steady-State Equilibrium  
Some assumptions are helpful to simplify solutions. According to equations (28) 
and (29), there are two kinds of unit labor requirements in type 1 industries, which 
complicate the solution. Therefore, this study assumes that the unit labor requirements of 
Northern Firms in type 1 industries are also affected by α , which means that 
OWNW aa 11 =  and OBNB aa 11 = . A new generation of products means a higher level of 
technology. These products need a higher skilled/unskilled-labor input intensity. If an 
increase in outsourcing enhances the skilled/unskilled-labor ratio of the present 
generation product, then the next generation will use a higher skilled/unskilled-labor 
ratio. Therefore, outsourcing affects the unit labor requirements of Northern Firms as 
well.  
To find the steady-state solutions, use equations (15) and (35) and the relation, 
On + Nn + 2n +
Sn =1  
 
(39)    
( )
( )φμφμ
φ
++
−=
1
21 1 
r
nrnO , ( )( )φμφμ
μ
++
−=
1
21 1
r
nrn N , ( )( )φμφμ
φμ
++
−=
1
21
r
nnS ,                          
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where 1rn
N ∂∂ and 1rnO ∂∂ are positive, but 1rnS ∂∂ is negative. If an increase in α  
leads to an increase in 1r , 
Nn and On will increase and Sn will decrease. Using 
equation (39) in (37) and (38) and solving simultaneously yields total expenditure E   
 
(40)    ( )NWNBNBNW
NWB
N
NBW
NN
aaaan
aLaLwE
12122
11);( −
−= δα  ,                                              
 
and innovation intensity 1r   
 
(41)    ( ) ( ) ( ) 22 21 1; nn
nwr N κμφθ
φμκα +−−= ,                                                  
 
where BN
NWW
N
NBW
N
NBB
N
NW LaLaLaLa 1122 −−=κ and κ∂∂ 1r > 0 and ( )φαμθ −+= 1 . The 
influence of Nw and α on 1r  can be seen as the influence of Nw and α on κ . 
According to the calculation in Appendix A, the impact of Nw and α  on E andκ , 
which are NwE ∂∂ , α∂∂E , Nw∂∂κ , and ακ ∂∂ , depends on the difference of unit 
labor requirements between these two types of industries. If the unit labor requirements 
of white-collar workers in type 1 industries is larger than it is in type 2 industries, and 
unit labor requirements of blue-collar workers in type 1 industries are smaller than it is 
in  type 2 industries, Nwr ∂∂ 1 > 0, NwE ∂∂ < 0 and α∂∂E > 0. If the opposite is true, 
Nwr ∂∂ 1 < 0, NwE ∂∂ > 0 & α∂∂E < 0. I refer to the first situation as case I and the 
second situation as case II. Restating this: in case I, type 1 industries are absolutely 
white-collar-worker-intensive compared to type 2 industries.  In case II, type 1 
industries are absolutely-blue-collar-worker-intensive compared to type 2 industries. As 
for the impact ofα  on 1r , it can be divided into two effects. The first is called the direct 
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effect, in which α  influences 1r  throughθ . The second is the indirect effect, in which 
α  influences 1r  through k . The direct effect is positive, but the indirect effect depends 
on ακ ∂∂ , which is negative in case I and positive in case II. Thus, in case II, α∂∂ 1r  
is definitely positive. Even for case I, the effect of Nw on 1r  can offset the indirect effect 
and the total effect of an increase inα on 1r  can be positive. The next section shows this 
result.  
Concerning the intuition behind the results of α∂∂E , if type 1 industries are 
white-collar-intensive compared with type 2 industries, the cost reduction caused by 
outsourcing will be smaller than the increased benefit from innovation. Since consumers 
are willing to pay a higher price for a better quality commodity, expenditures will rise. 
On the contrary, if type 1 industries are blue-collar-intensive compared with type 2 
industries, the effect of cost reduction caused by outsourcing could suppress the effect of 
innovation. Thus, consumers pay less for the same purchase and reduce their 
expenditure. 
To see the intuition behind NwE ∂∂ , consider an increase in expenditures, holding 
Nw  constant first. The change encourages Northern Firms to increase production and 
outsourcing industries to choose a higher level of outsourcing fraction. If type 1 
industries, compared to type 2 industries, are white-collar-intensive, the effect of 
increasing production, which leads to hiring more white-collar workers in both type 1 
and type 2 industries, will be offset by the effect of choosing a higher level of 
outsourcing. Thus, a decrease in Nw can result after an increase in expenditures. On the 
contrary, if type 1 industries, relative to type 2 industries, are blue-collar-intensive, an 
increase in expenditures leads to a rising Nw . Furthermore, firms that put more resources 
in manufacturing products must reduce spending on R&D. Thus, the impact of Nw  on 
E is opposite to the impact on 1r  in each case. 
Next, by employing equations (39), (40), and (41), one can transform equations (18) 
and (20) into two equations, which helps us determine the two relative wages of 
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white-collar workers, Nw  and Sw .  Transforming equation (18) yields: 
 
(42)    ( ) [ ] );();();()(;, ααδααα NNSNOSWSSNWS wEwnwnwawwL += ,       SW  
  
and transforming equation (20) yields: 
 
(43)     ( ) [ ] );();();()(;, ααδααα NNSNOSBSSNBS wEwnwnwawwL += .       SB   
 
Separating )( SWS wa  and ( )Nwη , which represents the remaining variables related 
to Nw  in equations (42) and (43), helps determine the slope of SW and SB. According to 
Appendix B, Nw∂∂η  depends on Nwr ∂∂ 1 and NN wwE ∂∂ )( . If NN wwE ∂∂ )( is 
negative and Nwr ∂∂ 1 is positive, as in case I, Nw∂∂η  is negative. When Nw  
increases, Sw must decrease to restore equilibrium in equation (42), which leads to a 
downward-sloping line SW. Similarly, line SB is upward-sloping in case I. If 
NN wwE ∂∂ )( is positive and Nwr ∂∂ 1 is negative, as in case II, Nw∂∂η  is positive. 
The SW line is upward-sloping and the SB line is downward-sloping. When lines SW 
and SB are combined, one determines the equilibrium relative wages of white-collar 
workers in the North and South, Nw  and Sw . Figure 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate the 
steady-state equilibrium levels, *Nw  and *Sw , which occur at the intersection of SW and 
SB. Note that this equilibrium differs from that of the homogenous firm model in 2.1, 
and the relative wages of white-collar workers in the North and South are now 
determined by the outsourcing fraction.    
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Figure 4-1. Relative Wages of White-Collar Workers  
in the North and the South (case I) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Relative Wages of White-Collar Workers  
in the North and the South (case II) 
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The resource constraint (36) is used to solve 2r  in terms of 1r   
 
(44)    ( )11
22
1
22
2 * rrn
n
a
a
na
Lr
S
r
r
r
H
N γ=−= ,                                                      
 
where αγ ∂∂ is negative due to the limited quantity of high-skilled technology labor. If 
type 1 industries increase intensity of R&D and hire more high-skilled technology 
workers, it will force type 2 industries to decrease the intensity of their R&D. 
Using *Nw into equation (32) and substituting 2r with ( )1rγ  yields  
 
(45)    ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) HWNr
ON
r wwarr
CCrE
ar
E =++++
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1
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1
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1
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1
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H1 
(46)    ( ) ( )( ) HWNr
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*
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δ
ργ  
 
H2 
where *NlC = ( ) WNNNl wwC *  and *OlC = ( )( ) WNNO wwC α−*  for type l  industries, which 
are functions of *Nw . By naming equation (45) and (46), which represent the 
relationship between innovation and production, H1 and H2, both H1 and H2 state the 
negative relationship between Hw  and WNw  under the equilibrium level and the 
intersection of these two lines gives the equilibrium levels of *Hw  and *WNw .  
According to Appendix C, there are two possible equilibria. The first is that the 
H1 line has a larger intercept and a steeper slope than the H2 line. The second one is that 
                                                 
9 ω stands for μρφμρ +++++ 11 rr  in this equation.  And, since 1r∂∂ω < 0, it can be 
treated as a constant and doesn’t affect our analysis.   
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the H2 line has a larger intercept and a steeper slope than the H1 line. However, only one 
of these two equilibria is stable. The reason is as follows. Between these two types of 
industries, type 1 industries are leaders, since type 1 industries can useα  to reduce cost, 
which leads to changes in the wages of white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. On 
the contrary, type 2 industries, which do not have the strategic ability, are followers. 
Starting with the case where H1 has a larger intercept and steeper slope, in Figure 5, 
under Hw1  type 1 industries would like to pay white-collar workers 
Ww1 . Type 2 
industries can only offer Hw2  under 
Ww1 . Therefore, firms in type 1 industries can hire 
scientists at Hw2 and increase their production by hiring more workers, which raises the 
wages from Ww1  to 
Ww2 . Under 
Ww2 , to hire scientists type 2 industries can only offer 
Hw3 . Since 
Hw3 is lower than the willingness-to-pay for hiring scientists of firms in type 
1 industries, they can expand their production until attaining the equilibrium wages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Stability of Northern Wages of Scientists and White-Collar Workers 
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Starting from the other side in Figure 5, under Ww5 , type 2 industries are willing 
to pay Hw5 , which is much higher than the offering wages of type 1 industries. To 
compete with type 2 industries, type 1 industries need to reduce wage expenditures from  
Ww5  to 
Ww4 . Under 
Ww4 , type 1 industries are willing to pay 
Hw5 , which is still lower 
than the willingness-to-pay of type 2 industries. Type 1 industries again need to reduce 
their production costs. The wages of white-collar workers will continue to decrease and 
the wages of scientists will continue to increase, until the wages reach equilibrium. The 
equilibrium formed by H1, with a larger intercept and steeper slope and H2, with a 
smaller intercept and flatter slope, is stable. 
Conversely, if H2 has a steeper slope and higher intercept (line A) than H1 (line B), 
the equilibrium located at the intersection of H1 and H2 is not stable. To see this, 
starting with Ww2 , type 1 industries are willing to pay 
Hw3 , but type 2 industries are 
willing to pay Hw2 . In order to compete with type 2 industries, type 1 industries need to 
reduce the wages of white-collar workers from Ww2 to
Ww1 .  However, under
Ww1 , type 2 
industries are willing to offer Hw1 , which induces type 1 industries to adjust outsourcing 
fraction more and the equilibrium will never be attained.  
 Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium level of Hw  and WNw  at the intersection of 
H1 and H2. The equilibrium level of blue-collar workers in the North is equal 
to ** NWN ww . Finally, the determination of equilibrium levels of wages of white-collar 
workers and blue-collar workers in the South is the same as in the discussion in 2.1.3.  
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Figure 6. The Changes of Northern Wages of Scientists and White-Collar Workers  
 
2.2.2.4 Comparative Static Analysis       
When type 1 industries increase the outsourcing fraction of production to the South, 
it will increase the labor demand of both Southern white-collar and blue-collar workers. 
For a given Nw , the increasing demand of white-collar workers will push the relative 
wage of white-collar workers in the South to a higher level. Therefore, the SW line will 
shift to the right. On the other hand, the increasing demand for blue-collar workers 
decreases the relative wage of white-collar workers in the South. Therefore, line SB 
shifts to the left. The change in relative wage of white-collar workers in the North 
depends on the slopes of lines SW and SB. In case I, the change in α  makes the 
equilibrium of the relative wage of Northern white-collar workers increase 
unambiguously (from point A to B in Figure 4.a.). This case is much like the solution of 
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Sayek and Sener (2006), in which they use this case to explain the wage inequality 
between skilled labor and unskilled labor caused by outsourcing. The wage gap could be 
even larger if scientists also benefit from outsourcing or smaller if scientists do not 
benefit from outsourcing. In case II, an increase in α  decreases the equilibrium of the 
relative wage of Northern white-collar workers (from point A to B in Figure 4.b.).  
The results above tell us that if outsourcing firms, compared to non-outsourcing 
firms, are white-collar-workers-intensive, outsourcing will raise the relative wage of 
white-collar workers and cause wage inequality. Conversely, if outsourcing firms, 
compared to non-outsourcing firms, are blue-collar-intensive, outsourcing will not cause 
the deterioration of blue-collar wages. The intuition behind this result is as follows. 
There are three effects of outsourcing on labor demand.  The first one is the substitution 
effect. This effect, caused by outsourcing industries shifting labor demand from the 
North to the South, decreases the labor demand of both white-collar and blue-collar 
workers. The second is the skill effect. The skill effect can increase labor demand of 
white-collar workers since outsourcing pushes Northern and Outsourcing Firms toward 
skilled-labor-intensive production. The third is the scale effect. Outsourcing can increase 
the profit of outsourcing firms, which leads to increased production. Therefore, the labor 
demand, especially the labor used intensively by outsourcing firms, will increase as well. 
Thus, after an increase in α , if the total effect of the skill effect and scale effect are 
larger than the substitution effect, as in case I, the relative wage of Northern white-collar 
workers will increase. On the other hand, if the total effect of the skill effect and scale 
effect are smaller than the substitution effect, as in case II, outsourcing will decrease the 
relative wage of Northern white-collar workers.    
After determining the relative Northern wage, Nw , I can investigate the change in 
the innovation intensity of type 1 industries. In case I, an increase inα  raises 1r  by the 
direct effect and reduces 1r  by the indirect effect. However, if the negative indirect 
effect caused by an increase inα  on 1r  can be offset by the effect of increasing Nw , the 
total effect ofα  on 1r  in case I is positive. Considering the influence ofα  on unit 
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labor requirements of production is greater than or equal to the influence of Nw on unit 
labor requirements of production,10 Appendix A.3 shows that in case 1, the negative 
indirect effect caused by an increase inα  on 1r  will be offset by the effect of 
increasing Nw . This means an increase inα  raises innovation intensity of type 1 
industries and increases the fraction of Northern Firms and Outsourcing Firms. It 
decreases the fraction of Southern Firms. 
To determine the change of Hw  and WNw , I need to examine equations (45) and 
(46). In case I, an increase in α  raises E and 1r , but reduces the unit cost of 
outsourcing firms. Meanwhile, the rising Nw  will diminish E , increase the innovation 
intensity of type 1 industries, and reduce the innovation intensity of type 2 industries. 
According to equation (45), since total effects of an increase inα  on E are negative, 
which is always smaller than the positive total effects of an increase inα  on 1r , the 
intercept of H1 will decrease and the slope becomes flatter. The movement of H2 is the 
opposite. Since 2r  is decreasing, according to equation (46), the intercept of H2 will be 
larger and the slope becomes steeper. The new H1 and H2 yield a higher level of 
equilibrium Hw unambiguously. As for WNw , to get a positive
W
Nw , it not only requires that 
the total of the skill effect and the scale effect dominate the substitution effect, but it also 
requires that the cost reduction caused by outsourcing is sufficient. According to 
Appendix D, if the condition WNw  is not satisfied, the equilibrium moves from point A to 
B in Figure 6. If the condition WNw  is satisfied, the intercept of H1 will increase and the 
slope can be steeper and the intersection of H1 and H2 results in higher equilibrium 
levels of both Hw and WNw . The movement from point A to C in Figure 6 illustrates this 
result.   
 
Proposition 2. If outsourcing industries are white-collar-intensive relative to 
                                                 
10 It is reasonable since that the impact from outsourcing on labor demand is more direct than the one 
from the relative wage. 
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non-outsourcing industries, an increase in the outsourcing fraction of production will 
increase scientists’ wages unambiguously. The wage level of white-collar workers can be 
increased or decreased. Blue-collar workers’ wages relative to skilled workers in the 
North, will decrease unambiguously. 
 
Under the circumstances of case II, an increase inα  will diminish E , but still 
increase 1r  and reduce the unit cost of outsourcing firms. Meanwhile, the falling 
relative Northern wage Nw  will increase the innovation intensity of type 1 industries, 
but reduce E  and the innovation intensity of type 2 industries. Thus, even though the 
relative wage of white-collar workers in the North decreases, 1r  is still increasing and 
E  is still decreasing. This leads to the increasing fraction of Northern Firms and 
Outsourcing Firms and the decreasing fraction of Southern Firms. According to 
equations (45) and (46), the change of H1 and H2 are still from point A to point C in 
Figure 6. The wages of blue-collar workers may rise or fall after an increase in α , as 
the relative wage of white-collar workers is increasing. Table 1 is the summary of the 
comparative Static Analysis under an increase in outsourcing.   
 
Proposition 3. If outsourcing industries relative to non-outsourcing industries are 
blue-collar-workers-intensive, an increase in the outsourcing fraction of production will 
increase scientists’ wages and decrease white-collar wages in the North unambiguously. 
The wage of blue-collar workers in the North may not deteriorate. 
 
As for Southern workers, since I simplify the setting of unit labor requirements 
between Outsourcing Firms and Southern Firms in the South, there will be no effect on 
the relative wage of white-collar workers or wage levels of either white-collar or 
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blue-collar workers in the South after an increase inα .11 From equation (39) and the 
discussion of equation (39), I know that if 1r  increases, both 
Nn and On are increasing, 
but Sn is decreasing. The extent of international outsourcing will definitely increase 
because both α  and On are increasing. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Possible Situations and Comparative Static Analysis Results 
Case I Case II 
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NBa2 &
NWa1 >
NWa2  
NBa1 >
NBa2 &
NWa1 <
NWa2  
Nw
E
∂
∂ < 0; α∂
∂E > 0; Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 > 0 Nw
E
∂
∂ > 0; α∂
∂E < 0; Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 < 0
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂
αα
1ACE
w
Ef N <
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
α
11 r
w
rg N * 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂
αα
1ACE
w
Ef N >
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
α
11 r
w
rg N * 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂
αα
1ACE
w
Ef N <
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
α
11 r
w
rg N * 
Nw  ↑  ↑  ↓  
Hw  ↑  ↑  ↑  
W
Nw  ↓  ↑  ↓  
B
Nw  ↓  ↓  ↑ or ↓  
“*” stands for condition W
Nw  in Appendix D. 
Nw : The relative wage of white-collar workers in the North. 
Hw : The wage of scientists. 
W
Nw : The wage of Northern white-collar workers. 
B
Nw : The wage of  Northern blue-collar workers. 
 
 
                                                 
11 These results can be verified by a simple comparative static. If one sets up a model with different unit 
labor requirements between Outsourcing Firms in the South and Southern Firms, the change of relative 
wage of white-collar workers in the South will change, depending on the whose unit labor requirements 
are higher. Sayek and Sener (2006) can illustrate this idea. 
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2.3 Concluding Remarks 
The argument of whether outsourcing causes wage deterioration for unskilled labor 
has been much supported by the new evidence proposed by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996;1999). In their papers, outsourcing can explain 30.9% of the increase in the 
non-production wage share and 15% of the increase in the relative wage of 
non-production workers from 1979 to 1990. The empirical results of 1972-1979, 
however, are completely different from those for 1979-1990 and seem to contradict the 
concepts of the outsourcing theory.  
In this chapter, a dynamic product cycle model with three kinds of labor inputs, 
scientists, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers, is constructed.  It is shown 
that only scientists unambiguously benefit from outsourcing. Other skilled laborers are 
hurt by outsourcing. After relaxing the assumption of homogenous producers, if 
outsourcing industries, compared to non-outsourcing industries, are absolutely 
white-collar-intensive, an increase in the outsourcing fraction will raise the relative wage 
of white-collar workers. If outsourcing industries, compared to non-outsourcing 
industries are absolutely blue-collar-intensive, an increase in the outsourcing fraction 
will decrease the relative wage of white-collar workers. 
The wage level of white-collar laborers can be increased by outsourcing if the total effect 
of the skilled effect and the scale effect dominates the substitution effect, and the cost 
reduction caused by outsourcing is sufficient. The wage level of blue-collar workers may 
rise after an increase in outsourcing if outsourcing industries, compared to 
non-outsourcing industries are absolutely blue-collar-intensive. 
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CHAPTER III 
OUTSOURCING, INNOVATION, AND WAGE INEQUALITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE  
OUTSOURCING EFFECT ON WAGE INEQUALITY IN THE 1970S? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Jones (2005) proposes an idea that argues outsourcing could raise the wage of 
unskilled labor relative to skilled labor. This new idea contradicts traditional thinking 
about outsourcing. If what Jones (2005) proposes is true, then the phenomenon in the 
1970s is part of the impact of outsourcing on wages. A fitting question to the puzzle is, 
what makes the difference? What factor causes outsourcing to have different influences 
on relative wages? The answer to that question is the primary focus of this chapter.  
Further, if outsourcing does decrease the relative wage of skilled labor, I 
investigate this issue by two additional questions: first, did all skilled labor’s wages 
decrease because of outsourcing? Second, is the decreased relative wage of skilled labor 
to unskilled labor caused by increasing wages of unskilled labor or decreasing wages of 
skilled labor? 
The first question comes from the belief that outsourcing, which pushes production 
toward skilled labor, should benefit skilled labor the most. Even though the impacts of 
outsourcing somehow change and parts of skilled laborers do not benefit from 
outsourcing, parts of them should still benefit. In Grossman and Helpman’s (1991) 
quality ladders and product cycles model, a new generation of products is innovated in 
developed country, the North. After the production of this new product is mature, the 
producers in a developing country, the South, can imitate the state-of-the-art technology 
and learn the production processes. Glass and Saggi (2001) extend Grossman and 
Helpman’s (1991) model by considering outsourcing. Before Southern producers learn 
the technology, entrepreneurs in the North can outsource part of production to the South 
to arbitrage the wage difference between these two countries. One of their findings is 
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that outsourcing can increase firms’ innovation intensity. Therefore, if the skilled 
workers who conduct research and development (R&D) are different from the skilled 
workers in manufacturing production, outsourcing may have a different impact on these 
two groups of skilled workers. This study will decompose skilled workers into two 
groups, one of them working for inventing new products and the other working for 
manufacturing production. If the increasing profit caused by outsourcing leads to higher 
wages of R&D workers, I expect to see a positive and significant effect on workers’ 
wages even in the 1970s.  
For the second question, knowing the impacts of outsourcing on the relative wage 
is not enough. A rising relative wage of unskilled workers to skilled workers could mean 
either wages of unskilled worker were increased or decreased. The two-stage regression 
proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999) can answer this question. 
Section II is the theoretical discussion in which I borrow the framework of 
international fragmentation from Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Jones (2005) to find 
possible explanations for the outsourcing puzzle. In Section III, I investigate which 
explanation found in Section II is supported by U.S. manufacturing data. Then I employ 
regression estimation to check the influence of structural variables, including 
outsourcing on workers’ wages. As discussed above, I consider three kinds of labor. 
However, most data sources sort labor into two groups: skilled/unskilled or 
production/non-production. I decompose the skilled-labor data to separate out a R&D 
workers. Having done that, simple wage regressions of R&D workers can help us to 
check whether they always benefit from outsourcing. The two-stage regression is 
employed to answer the second question in this section. Section IV presents the 
conclusions. 
  
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I employ the idea of international fragmentation, which was 
proposed by Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Jones (2005) to explain the impact of 
outsourcing on wage inequality. To simply demonstrate the story of Jones and 
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Kierzkowski (2001) and Jones (2005) in discussing wage premiums, I assume that there 
are two productive factors, skilled labor (S) and unskilled labor (U), in this economy. 
Industries’ owners employ both kinds of labor to produce two fragments of production, a 
skilled-labor-intensive fragment and an unskilled-labor-intensive fragment. In Figure 1, 
for example, to produce $1 worth of final good B requires both skilled-labor-intensive 
fragment E0  and unskilled-labor-intensive fragment D0 . The price of the fragment 
can not be observed since they are non-tradable, but based on the factor price, G0  and 
F0  can show us the input requirement to produce $1 worth of component. Therefore, 
the slope of FG  reflects the wage of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor in this 
country. After an improvement of international communication and transportation, those 
fragments become internationally tradable. A skilled-labor-abundant country will 
outsource their unskilled-labor-intensive fragment to a developing country and 
concentrate on producing the more competitive, skilled-labor-intensive segment. In 
Figure 7, if the fragments of B commodities can be traded internationally, the producer 
of commodity B will forgo unskilled-labor- intensive production D0  and produce 
skilled-labor-intensive fragment H0 . H0  is shorter than F0 , which means that this 
country has an advantage in producing the skilled-labor-intensive good and the price of 
this fragment increases after outsourcing.   
Concerning wage premiums, if the endowment ratio is the ray labeled 1λ , 
international trade with fragments will deteriorate the relative wage of unskilled labor 
relative to skilled labor. If a country has a sufficiently high endowment ratio, like the ray 
labeled 2λ , the wages of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor will increase after 
outsourcing. Jones (2005) uses this case to explain the idea that international trade with 
fragmentation or outsourcing in a specific condition can benefit unskilled labor.    
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Figure 7. Hicksian Unit-Value Isoquant with Outsourcing 
 
This result contradicts conventional thought about the effects of outsourcing on 
unskilled labor. An easy explanation provided by Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) is that, 
because the price of higher skilled-labor-intensive commodity A does not change, the 
price of skilled labor must decrease after outsourcing the fragment of commodity B. 
Jones (2005) uses another explanation that focuses on the employment fraction. After 
outsourcing, the fraction of the unskilled labor that is employed in the 
skilled-labor-intensive fragment (AI/AH) is greater than that employed in commodity B 
(AJ/AB). Therefore, when the endowment ratio is high enough, outsourcing creates more 
hiring of unskilled labor than skilled labor.  
From Figure 7, it can also be seen that if commodity C is the product which can 
outsource its relatively unskilled-labor-intensive fragments, it will be easier to find an 
endowment ratio to satisfy the condition that outsourcing can benefit unskilled labor.  
Therefore, it seems that outsourcing industry’s skilled/unskilled-labor ratio also matters. 
To see this, this chapter simplifies the framework of Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and 
Jones (2005) to a model with only two products. One of them is a relatively 
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skilled-labor-intensive commodity (product A) and the other is a relatively 
unskilled-labor-intensive commodity (product B). Suppose only one of them is willing to 
or able to outsource its segment to the other countries. First, if the only one commodity 
is product A and the producer of product A starts concentrating on producing its relative 
skilled-labor-intensive segment, the Hicksian composite unit-value isoquant becomes the 
broken solid line ECBF  in Figure 8. If the only product that can trade its segment is 
product B, the Hicksian composite unit-value isoquant will become line EADF in 
Figure 8.  
Theα cone in Figure 8 tells us where the possible endowment ratio can be. It can 
be seen that only when the outsourcing industry is relatively unskilled-labor-intensive, 
outsourcing can benefit unskilled labor. 12  Furthermore, if I divide all possible 
endowment ratios into two areas according to the slope of the unit-value isoquant, only 
area I in Figure 8 can raise the wages of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor after 
outsourcing. In other words, in the case that the endowment ratio is not high enough, 
even though the outsourcing industry is relatively unskilled-labor-intensive, it is possible 
that outsourcing benefits skilled labor. 
 
                                                 
12 Jones (2005) points out that this result also illustrates a common proposition in the theory of 
international trade that technical progress in a country’s labor-intensive activity improves the country’s 
real wage rate. 
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Figure 8. Different Hicksian Unit-Value Isoquant under  
Different Types of Outsourcing Products 
 
In sum, according to the theoretical prediction, there are two possible explanations 
for the different effects of outsourcing on wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
first is the move of endowment in the skilled/unskilled-labor ratio. It means that, ceteris 
paribus, the difference in endowment of the skilled/unskilled labor ratio causes the 
different effects of outsourcing on unskilled labors’ wages relative to skilled labor. In 
other words, during the 1970s the skilled/unskilled ratio in the United States was high 
enough for outsourcing to benefit unskilled labor, but it was not during the 1980s. The 
second explanation is that the difference in wage effects caused by outsourcing between 
the 1970s and 1980s was mainly generated by the shift of the structure of employment in 
the outsourcing industry. In the 1970s, the outsourcing industry was relatively 
unskilled-labor-intensive and in the 1980s it was skilled-labor-intensive. If the first 
prediction is right, one should see a decreasing endowment ratio from 1970 to 1990. If 
the second explanation is appropriate, one should find that the outsourcing goods were 
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produced mainly by relatively unskilled-labor-intensive industries in the 1970s, and 
produced by relatively skilled-labor-intensive industries in the 1980s. I name the first 
explanation “endowed explanation” and the second explanation “labor-intensity 
explanation.” In the next section, the empirical data will be examined to determine 
which factor causes the different impacts of outsourcing on relative wage.  
Those explanations, however, could still be challenged by the thinking of 
outsourcing as a technological improvement. Another interpretation is needed to explain 
why a technological improvement decreased skilled labor’s wages. This chapter 
considers that perhaps some skilled workers did benefit from outsourcing in the 1970s, 
but most of them did not benefit. In other words, the skilled labor in the theoretical 
model may not represent all “skilled labor.” They are a parts of skilled labor that might 
be hurt by outsourcing. Naturally the question is, “which workers?” following the 
discussion in Section I, the beginning of the life of a commodity with a brand new 
state-of-the-art technology first needs some innovation work. Then, if the producer wins 
the innovation competition, the product can be sold in North and South markets. 
Therefore, I can break the whole production procedure into two parts. The first part is to 
invent a new technology and the second is to produce it. By assuming that skilled 
workers working in the Innovation Department are separated from workers working in 
the Production Department, outsourcing may cause different effects on their labor 
demand. Glass and Saggi (2001) find that outsourcing increases the innovation intensity. 
Thus, in the 1970s the skilled workers in the Innovation Department benefited from 
outsourcing, even though the rest of skilled labor were harmed by outsourcing. This idea 
will be tested empirically in the next section.  
 
3.3 Empirical Evidence 
3.3.1 Tests of the Theories  
To test which explanation in the last section best explains the impact of 
outsourcing during the 1970s and 1980s, this study will employ data from manufacturing 
industries of the United States to test these two explanations. The NBER Productivity 
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Database [Bartelsman and Gray, 1996] can provide the information. Starting with 
endowment explanation, drawing the U.S. non-production/production-labor ratios from 
1970 to 1990 can see the change during these two decades. In Figure 9, the answer to the 
question of whether the first explanation is supported by the data of the United States is 
doubted. It can be seen that the employment ratio of non-production workers relative to 
production labor keeps going up from 1970 to 1990. It may not be sensible to think that 
the relative wage of skilled labor did not increase by outsourcing in the 1970s is due to 
the shifting employment ratio. Therefore, I move on to testing the second explanation.  
 
 
Figure 9. Skilled/Unskilled Labor Ratio in the U.S. Manufacturing Industries: 1970-1990 
 
In the second explanation, two industries are distinguished by their 
skilled/unskilled-labor ratios. This study sorts all manufacturing industries’ 
non-production/production-labor ratio from lowest to highest, and simply divides them 
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into two groups.13 By naming the first 50% of all manufacturing industries relatively 
unskilled-labor-intensive industries (hereafter RU industry), and the rest of them 
relatively skilled-labor-intensive industries (hereafter RS industry), and by letting the 
industry that outsources more of its part of production than the other does be the 
relatively outsourcing industry, this study can compute the weighted average outsourcing 
fraction of each group to check which one of them is relatively an outsourcing industry.  
Feenstra and Hanson (1996; 1999) propose a new method to estimate outsourcing, 
which is constructed by outsourcing intermediate-material purchases divided by total 
consumption. Material purchase data comes from the Census of Manufactures and is 
collected every five years in those years ending with 2 and 7. Therefore, outsourcing 
data are available in 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992, during 1970 to 1992. Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) kindly provide us with intermediate-material purchase data. I can 
compute the outsourcing fraction of each manufacturing industry by using their data and 
U.S. imports data captured from the NBER collection.14 According to Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999), outsourcing can be measured in two ways. The broad measure of 
outsourcing considers all industries’ inputs purchased from other four-digit SIC 
manufacturing industries and the narrow measure of outsourcing considers only the 
industries’ inputs purchased from the same two-digit SIC industries. Both types of 
outsourcing are considered when I compute weighted average outsourcing fractions. 
Table 2 lists all weighted averages of the skilled/unskilled-labor ratio and 
outsourcing fractions of both the RS industry and the RU industry in the years 1972, 
1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992.15 According to the numbers of weighted averages of 
skilled/unskilled-labor ratio, the difference of skilled-labor intensity between the RS 
industry and the RU industry increases over the same period. The skilled/unskilled-labor 
ratio of the RS industry in 1992 is almost one-and-a-half times larger than in 1972. The 
skilled/unskilled-labor ratio of the RU industry only grows a little from 1972 to 1992. In 
                                                 
13 After sorting and drawing the data, it can be seen that there is a smoothing increasing curve. Thus, a 
workable and clear way to divide them in groups is to separate them as in the theoretical analysis in the 
Section 2. 
14 Please see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) regarding the formula for computing outsourcing. 
15 Both weighted fractions and ratios are weighted by industries’ share of total manufacturing shipments. 
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general, although the numbers in the broad measure are larger than the narrow measure, 
the two measures tell the same story about the RS and RU industry during these two 
decades.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of Weighted Outsourcing Fraction in Different Types of Industries 
Year Weighted skilled/unskilledLabor ratio 
Weighted outsourcing fraction
-narrow measure 
Weighted outsourcing 
fraction 
-broad measure 
 RS industry RU industry RS industry RU industry RS industry RU industry
72 59.76  19.44  2.02  2.48  4.86  5.92  
77 63.00  21.00  2.74  2.49  6.72  6.44  
82 73.28  24.68  3.80  2.37  8.50  7.15  
87 84.12  23.87  5.19  4.44  12.36  10.09  
92 86.53  24.12  7.49  5.38  14.18  11.39  
Notes: RS industry is Relative-Skilled-labor-intensive industry. RU industry is 
Relative-Unskilled-labor-intensive industry. All ratios and fractions are computed over 445 
four-digit SIC industries (excluding 2067, 2794, and 3483) and weighted by the industry share of 
total manufacturing shipments.  
 
According to Table 2, the RU industry has a larger outsourcing fraction only in 
1972. After 1972, outsourcing predominantly occurs in the RS industry and its 
outsourcing fraction increases rapidly. The RU industry’s outsourcing fraction rises as 
well, but at a slower rate than the RS industry, regardless of the measure used. My 
explanation to this point is lacking. Based on the data in Table 2, outsourcing had 
already become predominant in the RS industry by 1977. However, the methodology is 
problematic if the outsourcing industry outsources the basic part of production that is 
performed by unskilled labor. The weighted skilled/unskilled-labor ratio computed in the 
first column of Table 2 can only represent the skilled/unskilled-labor ratio of the RS and 
RU industry in base years, 1972 and 1982. After an increase in outsourcing, the 
skilled/unskilled-labor ratio will be higher since the basic part of production has already 
been outsourced to the South. Thus, some industries in the RS industry in 1977 could be 
part of the RU industry in 1972. Table 3 illustrates the same thing as Table 2 but is based 
on the skilled/unskilled-labor ratio from five years ago when I split them into the RS/RU 
industry. In 1977, the weighted outsourcing fraction of the RU industry was greater than 
the fraction of the RS industry. After 1982, the results are similar to those in Table 2; the 
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RS industry’s outsourcing fraction was greater than the RU industry no matter what 
measure of outsourcing I use. Thus, I can say that the outsourcing industry was the RU 
industry in the 1970s and was the RS industry in the 1980s, and the labor-intensity 
explanation is more sensible to explain the different influences caused by outsourcing 
between the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
Table 3. Comparison of Weighted Outsourcing Fraction in Different Types of Industries 
-Based on the Rank 5 Yrs. Ago 
Year Weighted skilled/unskilled labor ratio 
Weighted outsourcing fraction
-narrow measure 
Weighted outsourcing 
fraction 
-broad measure 
 RS industry RU industry RS industry RU industry RS industry RU industry
77 60.75  20.89  2.52  2.78  6.46  6.79  
82 72.85  25.18  3.57  2.75  8.35  7.39  
87 83.05  24.49  5.72  3.71  12.44  9.95  
92 86.38  24.37  7.41  5.49  14.18  11.40  
Notes: RS industry is Relative-Skilled-labor-intensive industry. RU industry is 
Relative-Unskilled-labor-intensive industry. All ratios and fractions are computed over 445 
four-digit SIC industries (excluding 2067, 2794, and 3483) and weighted by the industry share of 
total manufacturing shipments.  
 
Although Figure 9 and Tables 2 and 3 help us understand that the labor-intensity 
change in the outsourcing industry caused the different influence of outsourcing on 
wages in the 1970s and 1980s, this issue still needs more evidence and empirical results 
to realize the full effect of outsourcing on wage inequality. In the next step, I answer the 
following two questions, first, did outsourcing worsen all skilled workers’ wages in the 
1970s? and second, was the decreasing relative wage of skilled labor caused by 
decreasing the wage level of skilled workers or increasing the wage level of unskilled 
workers? In the next section, I address these two questions through regression 
estimation. 
 
3.3.2 Regression Estimations 
As discussed in the last chapter, a life cycle of a product starts with innovation. After 
winning the innovation competition, the product can be produced and sold. Thus, the 
influence of outsourcing on a manufacturing industry can be split into two parts. First, 
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outsourcing increases R&D intensity and also raises R&D workers’ wages. Second, 
outsourcing improves the productivity and the improvement makes the prices of 
commodities and relative wage of white-collar workers change. This study will verify 
the first statement by wage regression estimation and employ two-stage regression to 
deal with the second issue. This study needs data which have two groups of skilled labor; 
those in the Production Department, such as managers and secretaries, and those in the 
Innovation Department. The procedure of construction new data is introduced in the 
next. 
 
3.3.2.1 Data Construction and Decomposition 
According to the National Science Foundation (NSF), R&D is mainly done by 
R&D workers, who are scientists and engineers, and supporting personnel, like 
technicians and craftsmen.16 Although NSF can provide the wage cost and employment 
of R&D in each two or three-digit industry from 1953, their data still can not be 
employed in this study. First, even though NSF can provide us the number of 
full-time-equivalent (FTE) scientists and engineers by industry, NSF has not separated 
wage data of scientists and engineers and supporting personnel since 1976. This makes 
the wages of R&D workers unknown. Second, to avoid possible disclosure of 
information about operations of individual companies, some industries’ data are being 
withheld for a few years. Thus, this study has to employ another data source to 
decompose skilled labor. 
Current Population Survey (CPS) data provide the information this study needs 
about the workers in the United States, including occupation, industry, and wage income. 
The occupation information can be employed to distinguish R&D workers and other 
skilled workers. In addition, March CPS data since 1976 can tell us how many weeks the 
respondent worked last year and how many hours they usually worked in a week in the 
last year. The product of these two can be seen as working-hour data. The NBER 
                                                 
16 Their definition of scientists and engineers are those persons employed by the company who are 
engaged in scientific or engineering work at a level that requires knowledge of physical, life, engineering, 
or mathematical science equivalent. Please refer to NSF website for details. 
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Productivity Database includes the value of shipment, price deflator for value of 
shipments, number of employees, number of production worker hours, and number of 
production workers of 445 industries in the 1972 four-digit SIC.17 Since the NBER 
Productivity Database has all the information this study needs about industries in the 
United States except the separated information of workers in Innovation and the 
Production Department, this study employs CPS data as an auxiliary data source to 
decompose non-production workers in the NBER Productivity Database. However, there 
are some data consistency issues that need to be dealt with before performing the 
decomposition.  
First, the production/non-production data in the NBER Productivity Database 
comes from the Annual Survey Manufactures (ASM), and its production/non-production 
classification may not be the same as the white-collar/blue-collar classification in CPS. 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) compared CPS data with ASM data and found that 
these two categories are similar in that they rose together from 1973 until 1987 with the 
discrepancy never more than two percentage points. Although they have similar trends 
and a small discrepancy, their classifications still need to be reviewed and some workers 
in CPS white-collar classification need to be switched to blue-collar to make the 
discrepancy as small as possible since this study actually combines these two datasets. 
Second, from 1970 to 1990 there are three kinds of classifications of occupations in CPS 
data, 1970 classification, 1980 classification, and 1990 classification. I choose the 1980 
classification as the main one and applies it to the others. Third, similarly, CPS has its 
classification of industries and amended industry classification every ten years during 
1970-1990. The 1980 classification was also chosen as a benchmark and 1970 and 1990 
were modified to be the same as the 1980 classification.18 The benefit of choosing 1980 
                                                 
17 Originally, there are 450 industries in four-digit 1972 SIC. By following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), I 
exclude three industries (SIC 2067, 2794, 3483) due to missing data on material purchases or prices. 
Additionally, two industries’ (SIC 3672, 3673) data are not available in the recent version of the NBER 
Productivity Database. 
18 For consistency with 1970 and 1990 classification, some industries in 1980 need to be merged with 
another industry. They are census code 122 (merging with 121), 211 (merging with 210), 232 (merging 
with 241), 301 (merging with 300), 322 (merging with 321), 332 (merging with 331), 350 (merging with 
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CPS classification of industries is that it provides a “bridge” between CPS codes and 
three-digit SIC codes for converting CPS data into three-digit SIC. Fourth, March CPS 
asks respondents about their wages and working hours last year. Thus, if one wants to 
collect data of wages and working hours, for example, in 1990, he needs to employ 
March CPS data in 1991. Nevertheless, March 1990 still gives us the information of 
employee numbers in each industry, which is the total numbers of respondents in each 
industry, for 1990. For consistency, this study keeps those respondents who are looking 
for a job or not working, but excludes those respondents who did not have wage income 
last year. With this modification, all the information on wages, employments, and 
working hours in 1991 tells us the information for 1990.  
Unlike NSF data, even if a respondent’s occupation in CPS data tells us that he or 
she should be classified as R&D worker, he or she is not necessarily doing R&D. 
Engineers, for example, are not all involved in R&D. Besides, some skilled workers who 
do not belong to this classification of R&D workers actually are involved in R&D. 
Economists, for example, are in charge of doing economic analysis of implementation 
and planning of R&D projects. A designer who is responsible for designing the 
appearance of new products should be also considered a R&D worker. Therefore, this 
study has two definitions of R&D workers. The first group, named narrow definition of 
R&D workers, includes those occupations in which a high proportion of workers are 
doing R&D. In the 1980 CPS classification of occupations, they are computer scientists 
(64-65), mathematical scientists (68), and natural scientists (69-82).19 The second group 
is broad definition of R&D workers that include both narrow definition of R&D workers 
and occupations in which a lower proportion of workers are doing R&D. In 1980 CPS 
classification, they are scientists (64-65, 68, 69-83), engineers (44-62), economists (166), 
and designers (185). I also consider educational qualification. Respondents who are 
R&D workers must at least have finished high school.20 The rest of skilled workers are 
                                                                                                                                                
342), 362 (merging with 370), 382 (merging with 381), 390 (merging with 391), and 392 (merging with 
391).   
19 Medical scientists (83) are been excluded for consistence purpose with 1970 classification. 
20 The education qualification in NSF data for a R&D worker is a college degree. Since occupations of 
R&D workers in this study have more variety, the education qualification in this study is lower.   
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white-collar workers. The regression results under a decomposition rule of the narrow 
definition of R&D workers can be thought of as lower-bound results and under the broad 
definition of R&D workers can be thought of as upper-bound results. The broad 
definition of R&D may cause estimation problems if a considerable fraction of engineers, 
economists, and designers are not doing R&D jobs. The narrow definition of R&D may 
cause underestimation if in fact most engineers, economists, and designers are R&D 
workers. Thus, comparing results from both specifications can give us a better answer to 
the questions. 
The decomposition procedure can be divided into two parts. First, by employing 
March CPS data, this study computes both the R&D workers’ and white-collar workers’ 
shares in total skilled laborers’ employment and wage by industries. If the data year is 
later than 1976, R&D workers’ and white-collar workers’ shares in total skilled laborers’ 
working hours are also computed. Average working hours of all skilled workers in each 
industry are also needed for converting employment data of non-production labor in the 
NBER Productivity Database into working-hour data. Second, multiplying the shares of 
wage and number of employment in the first step by wage payment and number of 
employment of non-production workers of the NBER Productivity Database, yields 
R&D workers’ wage, white-collar workers’ wage, R&D workers’ number of 
employment, and white-collar workers’ number of employment. As for the data after 
1976, employment data of non-production workers from the NBER Productivity 
Database are multiplied by average working hours of all skilled workers from the March 
CPS data to get skilled laborers’ working-hour data. Then, the second step is redone with 
R&D workers’ and white-collar workers’ shares in working-hour computed from March 
CPS data to get the working-hour wages and employment for R&D workers and 
white-collar workers. Last, this study names all production workers in the NBER 
Productivity Database blue-collar workers. 
As mentioned before, the two classifications need to be coordinated. Drawing these 
two data sets together helps us to check the discrepancy between them. Figure 10 
illustrates non-production workers’ share in the wage bill. It can be seen that the wage 
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shares computed from CPS data are obviously higher than those computed from the 
NBER Productivity Database. That means some occupations in CPS classification of 
white-collar workers should be members of the production workers. Technicians 
(213-235) who are also in charge of maintenance and repair are members of white-collar 
workers in classification of occupation in CPS, but according to the definition of 
production workers in ASM,21 they are production workers. After switching technicians 
to blue-collar workers, the wage shares computed from CPS data are closer to those 
computed from the NBER Productivity Database.22  Non-production workers’ share in 
total employment has the same problem as workers’ share in the wage bill. This study 
also shifts technicians from white-collar workers to blue-collar to deal with that problem. 
In Figure 10, it can be seen that the adjustment can narrow the discrepancy.23 
White-collar workers’ share of the wage bill in Figure 10 and white-collar workers’ 
share of total employment in Figure 11 illustrate the difference in white-collar workers’ 
wages between the 1970s and 1980s. In Figure 10, it can be seen that the wage share of 
white-collar workers was non-increasing in 1970s. Figure 11 also shows that the 
employment share of white-collar workers was increasing in the 1970s. Thus, one can 
guess that wages for white-collar workers in 1970 were decreasing. White-collar 
workers’ share in the wage bill and total employment were both increasing in the 1980s. 
This is a well-known issue about the deterioration of the relative wage of low-skilled 
workers to high-skilled workers. Compared to white-collar workers, R&D workers’ 
share in the wage bill and total employment is much more stable no matter what 
definition this study uses. Their share in the wage bill and total employment slightly 
increased during these two decades. 
                                                 
21 Quoting from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau, production workers includes workers (up through 
the line-supervisor level) engaged in fabricating, processing, assembling, inspecting, receiving, storing, 
handling, packing ware-housing, shipping (but not delivering), maintenance, repair, janitorial and guard 
services, and product development. Please see http://www.census.gov/mcd/asm-as1.html for details. 
22 The correlation coefficient of weighted shares in the wage bill from these two sources is 0.970.  
23 The correlation coefficient of weighted shares in employment from these two sources is 0.967. 
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Figure 10. Non-production Workers’ Share in the Wage Bill 
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Table 4 gives summary statistics for the workers’ data which I constructed from the 
NBER Productivity Database and CPS data for 1972-1979 and 1979-1990. R&D 
workers who have high-technology skills and are usually well-educated should get the 
highest pay among other kinds of workers. The numbers in Table 4 confirm this idea. In 
every period, R&D workers get the highest average pay per year. If I employ 
working-hour data, R&D workers still get the highest pay per hour. Annual changes of 
workers’ wages in 1972-1979 tell almost the same story. R&D workers’ pay grew the 
fastest in that time period. During 1979-1990, however, if I use the data counting 
workers by number of employment, R&D workers’ pay did not grow the fastest. In fact, 
their pay in 1979-1990 grew the slowest under the broad definition of R&D workers. If 
narrow definition of R&D workers and working-hour data are used, R&D workers’ pay 
still grew the fastest.  
It’s not surprising that low-skilled labor (blue-collar workers) got the lowest pay 
during these two decades. The annual change, however, was higher than for white-collar 
and non-production workers in 1972-1979. The question now is which structural variable 
caused this unusual phenomenon? This puzzle can be solved by employing two-stage 
regression. In 1979-1990, the annual change in wages of blue-collar workers’ was 
smaller than the one of white-collar workers. Note that the difference in annual change 
between white-collar and blue-collar workers in 1979-1990 becomes smaller when I use 
working-hour data. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) use number of employment data in 
non-production workers and working-hour data in production workers in their study. If 
working-hour data of non-production workers are employed, it may be possible to get a 
weaker effect of outsourcing on relative wage of non-production workers.  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
 1972-1979 1979-1990 
 
Average 
USD/year 
Annual 
change 
Average 
USD/year  
(USD/ hour) 
Annual 
change 
Average and change in log workers’ 
prices: 
   
Blue-collar workers 11443  7.460  19641  4.964  
   (10)  (4.705)  
Non-production 16648  7.201  29324  5.432  
   (14)  (5.025)  
White-collar workers: 15666  7.052  27438  5.517  
Broad definition of R&D 
k
  (13)  (5.060)  
White-collar workers: 16449  7.179  28939  5.441  
Narrow definition of    (14)  (4.980)  
R&D workers: 21571  7.668  37076  4.780  
Broad definition of 
k
  (26)  (4.074)  
R&D workers: 20665  7.741  34159  4.843  
Narrow definition of    (32)  (6.160)  
R&D workers     
     
Factor cost-shares: Average 
(percent) 
Annual 
change 
Average 
(percent) 
Annual 
change 
Blue-collar workers 12.470  -0.299  10.185  -0.152  
Non-production 6.653  -0.201  6.442  -0.006  
White-collar workers 
(Broad definition) 
5.292  -0.113  4.984  -0.009  
White-collar workers 6.399  -0.129  6.194  0.002  
R&D workers 
(Broad definition)
1.361  -0.024  1.458  0.022  
R&D workers 0.253  -0.009  0.248  -0.001  
TFP :     
TFP     
(Broad R&D workers definition)  0.587   0.864  
    (0.880)  
(Narrow R&D workers definition)  0.537   0.839  
    (0.913)  
Note: Numbers in parentheses are calculated from working-hours data. Workers’ average wage are 
computed over the first and last year of each period and weighted by the industry share of total 
manufacturing payments to that factor. Those numbers are USD per person per year or per hour if 
using hourly data. The annual change of TFP is weighted by the industry share of total manufacturing 
shipments. Numbers of TFP are computed from primary factors excluding R&D workers, which are 
blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and capital. Please see Feenstra and Hanson (1996) for the 
rest of the summaries of variables, such as outsourcing and capital services.  
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The second part of Table 3 contains summaries of workers’ cost share in the 
industry’s value of shipment. Both production and non-production workers’ share in 
costs were decreasing, but R&D workers are relatively stable in their cost shares. 
Following Feenstra and Hanson (1999), this study measures Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) by the primal Tornqvist Index, which equals the log change of output minus the 
share-weighted log change of primary inputs. The difference in this paper is primary 
factors. Primary factors in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) are non-production workers, 
production workers, and capital. Ours are white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and 
capital. In the bottom of Table 3, it can be realized that TFP grews much faster in the 
1980s than the TFP in the 1970s, and including some possible R&D workers increased 
TFP. In this study, the wage cost of R&D should be thought of as a sunk cost. Producers 
spend it before producing their product. Thus, value-added prices in this study are also 
different from those in Feenstra and Hanson (1999).  
 
3.3.2.2 R&D Workers’ Wage Regression 
Since outsourcing can raise R&D intensity, one expects to see an increase in wages 
of R&D workers after outsourcing industries increase their outsourcing fraction. Unlike 
the impact of outsourcing on primary factors, outsourcing affects R&D workers directly, 
not via value-added price and productivity. The dependent variable in the wage 
regression is the change in R&D workers’ wages, and independent variables are 
outsourcing (narrow), outsourcing (difference), which is the difference between the 
narrow measure of outsourcing and the broad measure of outsourcing, change in log real 
output, change in the log capital/output ratio, computer share, and high-tech share 
(difference).  
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The measurement and source of outsourcing are the same as in Section 3.3.1. Real 
output and capital/output ratio can be computed from the NBER Productivity Database. 
Computer share measures the share of office, computing, and accounting machinery in 
total capital. High-tech capital (difference) computes the share of communications 
equipment; science and engineering instruments; and photo-copy and related equipment 
in total capital. The ex post rental price and ex ante rental price are employed in 
computing computer share and high-tech share (difference).24 Note that since computer 
share and high-tech share are only available at two-digit SIC level, the wage regressions 
allow the errors to be correlated across four-digit industries with each two-digit industry. 
Furthermore, this paper uses CPS data to decompose non-production workers and CPS 
classification can be converted into three-digit SIC. A dummy variable which corresponds 
to three-digit CPS is needed to capture the grouping effects.25 
Starting with the same period as Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Table 5-1 illustrates 
the regression of changes in R&D workers’ wages in 1979-1990. NP stands for 
non-production workers; BRD is broad definition of R&D workers, and NRD is narrow 
definition of R&D workers.  
                                                 
24 Data of high-technology capital come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Ex post rental prices 
are computed as in Hall and Jorgenson (1967). Ex ante rental prices are calculated by Berndt and Morrison 
(1995). All high-tech capital data in this study are kindly provided by Robert C. Feenstra and Gordon H. 
Hanson who obtained the data from Catherine Morrison and Don Siegel.  
25 The Dummy variable is log of CPS three-digit code. I’ll verify that the grouping effect does not hinder 
my regressions in two-stage regression models. 
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Table 5-1. Changes in R&D Workers’ Wages: 1979-1990 
 Dependent variables: average wage-changes per 
it
NP BRD NRD NP BRD NRD 
Independent variables:       
0.375 0.438 0.063 0.405 0.530 -0.002 Outsourcing (narrow) 
(1.49) (0.98) (0.14) (1.63) (1.17) (0.01)
0.088 1.332 0.165 0.145 1.447 0.217 Outsourcing (difference) 
(0.52) (2.11) (0.22) (0.89) (2.25) (0.29)
Capital services (ex post rental prices):      
0.038 0.668 -1.614  Computer share 
(0.14) (0.67) (1.47)  
0.317 -0.680 3.060  High-tech share (difference) 
(0.74) (0.54) (2.72)  
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):      
0.803 2.551 -0.289 Computer share 
(1.81) (1.25) (0.09)
0.924 -0.736 4.835 High-tech share (difference) 
(3.80) (0.52) (2.35)
0.069 0.064 0.000 0.051 0.039 -0.064 ( )ylnΔ  
(2.69) (1.31) (0.00) (2.02) (0.72) (0.96)
0.036 0.182 -0.063 0.017 0.148 -0.141 ( )yk /lnΔ  
(0.86) (1.31) (0.62) (0.40) (1.85) (1.39)
0.048 0.040 0.047 0.047 0.040 0.042 Constant 
(25.66) (6.15) (7.56) (31.52) (7.21) (7.32)
2R  0.095 0.057 0.083 0.127 0.063  0.091 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Note: Dependent variable NP is the changes of all non-production workers’ wages. Dependent 
variable BRD is the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in broad definition. 
Dependent variable NRD is the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in narrow 
definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all 
regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry 
groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also 
included in each regression. All dependent and independent variables are measured as annual changes 
and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing wage bills. 
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Before splitting non-production workers, neither outsourcing (narrow) nor 
outsourcing (difference) has a significant positive effect on the change in non-production 
workers’ wages. After filtering R&D workers from non-production workers, it can be 
seen that outsourcing (difference) has a significant positive effect on the changes in 
R&D workers’ wages under broad definition of R&D workers. Scientists’ wages, 
however, did not significantly increase with outsourcing. This means that the impact of 
outsourcing on scientists can not be captured by the employment data. I check those 
effects by using working-hour data. 
In Table 5-2, it can be seen that scientists’ wages were significantly affected by 
outsourcing (narrow). Therefore, this study finds some evidence to support the idea that 
outsourcing increased R&D workers’ wages during 1979-1990. As for other independent 
variables, only high-tech share (difference) has significantly positive effects on average 
R&D workers’ wage change per capita and per working-hour. It can be concluded that 
outsourcing is a main factor of rising R&D workers’ wages in 1979-1990.   
The argument that outsourcing raises R&D workers’ wages is robust if R&D 
workers’ wages were also significantly affected by outsourcing in 1972-1979. Feenstra 
and Hanson (1996) found that outsourcing has an insignificantly negative effect on 
non-production workers’ shares in the wage bill in 1972-1979. If R&D workers’ wages 
benefit from outsourcing as the theory predicts, separating R&D workers from other 
non-production workers can explain why not all of skilled labor is hurt by outsourcing. 
In Table 6, no matter which definition of R&D workers is employed, both outsourcing 
(narrow) and outsourcing (difference) have a positive significant effect on R&D 
workers’ wages. Computers in this period have insignificant effects on R&D workers’ 
wages. High-technology capital (difference) has a significant effect if capital is measured 
in ex post rental prices. This study finds some proof to support the argument that 
outsourcing increases R&D workers’ wages. Although it seems that outsourcing had no 
effect on all skilled workers in 1972-1979, outsourcing still increases R&D workers’ 
wages. 
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Table 5-2. Changes in the R&D Workers’ Wage: 1979-1990 
 Dependent variables: annual wage-changes per working hour  
NP BRD NRD NP BRD NRD
Independent variables:       
0.415 0.853 4.626 0.420 0.583 4.782 Outsourcing (narrow) 
(1.33) (0.64) (2.07) (1.43) (0.40) (2.16)
-0.326 0.378 -0.149 -0.307 -0.372 0.451 Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.67) (0.24) (0.04) (1.65) (0.20) (0.11)
Capital services (ex post rental prices):      
-0.195 -5.640 -3.650  Computer share 
(0.56) (1.59) (0.84)   
0.639 -0.594 7.299  High-tech share (difference) 
(1.30) (0.19) (0.84)   
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):      
-0.214 -4.506 10.969 Computer share 
(0.45) (0.57) (1.24)
1.648 2.866 13.414 High-tech share (difference) 
(7.46) (0.79) (2.00)
0.051 0.343 -0.014 0.042 0.253 -0.389 ( )ylnΔ  
(1.76) (1.40) (0.02) (1.78) (1.00) (0.49)
-0.004 0.372 -0.198 -0.009 0.224 -0.686 ( )yk /lnΔ  
(0.08) (0.82) (0.22) (0.17) (0.54) (0.69)
0.046 0.044 0.062 0.044 0.033 0.043 Constant 
(20.84) (1.76) (1.01) (26.74) (1.26) (0.72)
2R  0.088 0.015 0.039 0.127 0.007  0.058 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Note: Dependent variables NP are the changes of all non-production workers’ wages. Dependent 
variables BRD are the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in broad definition. 
Dependant variable NRD is the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in narrow 
definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all 
regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry 
groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also 
included in each regression. All dependent and independent variables are measured as annual changes 
and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing wage bills. 
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Table 6. Changes in the R&D Workers’ Wage: 1972-1979 
 Dependent variable: annual wage-changes per 
it NP BRD NRD NP BRD NRD 
Independent variables:       
-0.168 1.232 1.943 -0.070 1.480 2.304 
Outsourcing (narrow) 
(0.84) (3.14) (2.28) (0.40) (3.40) (2.39)
-0.152 0.113 1.100 -0.126 0.089 1.021 
Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.47) (0.47) (1.92) (1.14) (0.33) (2.07)
Capital services (ex post rental prices):      
-0.027 0.042 -5.033  
Computer share 
(0.06) (0.05) (2.13)    
0.785 1.750 0.836  
High-tech share (difference) 
(2.65) (1.93) (0.81)   
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):      
0.270 0.519 -9.615 
Computer share 
(0.42) (0.26) (1.98)
1.155 1.742 0.384 
High-tech share (difference) 
(2.43) (1.95) (0.30)
-0.020 -0.187 -0.131 -0.017 -0.180 -0.092 ( )ylnΔ  
(0.53) (2.62) (0.75) (0.47) (2.34) (0.53)
-0.006 -0.257 -0.057 -0.005 -0.258 -0.033 ( )yk /lnΔ  
(0.14) (4.16) (0.27) (0.13) (4.16) (0.16)
0.075 0.072 0.068 0.076 0.074 0.069 
Constant 
(19.69) (11.12) (5.15) (19.86) (11.57) (5.03)
2R  0.082 0.086 0.135 0.100  0.076  0.155 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Note: Dependent variable NP is the changes of all non-production workers’ wages. Dependent 
variable BRD is the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in broad definition. 
Dependent variable NRD is the changes of R&D workers’ wages, which is measured in narrow 
definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all 
regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry 
groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also 
included in each regression. All dependent and independent variables are measured as annual changes 
and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing wage bills. 
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3.2.2.3 Two-Stage Regression 
Continuing Feenstra and Hanson’s (1996) work on the impact of outsourcing on 
wages in 1972-1979 and 1979-1990, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) employ two-stage 
mandated price regressions to test the impact of outsourcing and high-technology on 
wages in 1979-1990. In their paper, the results support the idea that outsourcing and 
computers raised the relative wage of high-skilled labor and caused wage inequality in 
the United States during 1979-1990. The main reason for employing two-stage 
regression to this topic is that outsourcing and other structural variables, including 
high-technology capital, affect factor prices by influencing the price of the commodity 
and productivity first, and then the changes in the commodity’s price and productivity 
implied by those structural variables influence factor prices. The changes in the 
commodity’s price and productivity implied by those structural variables, however, are 
not measurable, but can be estimated by regressing commodities’ prices and productivity 
on the changes of structural variables. Thus, if one wants to know the impact of 
structural variables on factor prices, first, run the first-stage regression in which the 
dependent variable is value-added prices of commodities plus productivity and 
independent variables are structural variables. The estimated coefficients from first-stage 
regression, and their corresponding structural variables, consist of the dependent variable 
in the second-stage regression. Using the dependent variable and regressing it on the 
factor-shares, the coefficients of second-stage regressions show how a factor’s price 
changes due to those structural variables’ changes.   
For first-stage regression, Feenstra and Hanson (1999) argue that structural 
variables, including outsourcing, are non-neutral technological progresses having a 
direct impact on prices, over and above the indirect impact via productivity. The sign of 
product prices, however, can’t be easily predicted since the closed-form solution does 
not exist. Intuitively speaking, if outsourcing industries produce low-skilled 
labor-intensive goods, outsourcing part of production to developing countries should 
reduce its cost on the wage bill and will probably reduce product prices. On the contrary, 
if outsourcing industries produce high-skilled labor-intensive goods, the effect of cost 
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reduction may not suppress the effect of technological improvement.  
This study will employ the same two-stage regression, but use different primary 
factors and structural variables. R&D expenses should be thought of as a sunk cost, which 
is paid before production. The primary factors in this study are white-collar workers, 
blue-collar workers, and capital. Value-added prices that exclude R&D workers can be 
obtained by:  
 
(47)    NRDVAitP
−Δ ln = ( )[ ] ( )NRDVAitNRDVAitMEitMEitMEitYit SSPSSP −−−− +Δ+−Δ 11 5.0ln5.0ln  
 
where NRDVAitP
− and YitP are value-added price without considering R&D workers and 
output price in industry i =1,…,N. MEitS  denotes the cost-share of intermediate input, 
which also includes energy, in industry i =1,…,N. MEitP  denotes intermediate input 
prices, and NRDVAitS
−  denotes cost-share of value-added, excluding R&D cost. The new 
product and new state-of-the-art technology invented by R&D workers can progress the 
industry’s productivity and increase product prices. Thus, R&D expenditure should be 
included in the structural variables when I run the two-stage regression. Conducting R&D 
requires lots of high-technology facilities and R&D workers. High-technology capital 
can be captured by high-technology share (difference) and computer share. The wage 
cost of R&D can be represented by R&D payment share, which is computed by total 
expense in the wage bill of R&D workers divided by industry’s value of shipment. R&D 
payment share, however, is also influenced by outsourcing, computer, and 
high-technology share (difference). The relationship of R&D share in the wage bill to 
other structural variables is: 
 
(48)    RDitS =α′ itZΔ + itRD  
 
where RDitS  is R&D workers’ payment share in total value of shipment; itZ  is a vector of 
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structural variables; α  is a vector of coefficients, and itRD  is a residual term that 
captures all the other determinants to R&D payment share, which is assumed orthogonal 
to itZ . If first-stage regression also takes R&D payment share into consideration, then the 
regression becomes:26 
 
(49)    Δ VAitPln + itETFP  = β ′ itZΔ +γ ′ RDitS + itε . 
 
Putting equation (2) in Feenstra and Hanson’s (1999) first-stage regression gives the 
following equation: 
 
(50)    Δ VAitPln + itETFP  = φ ′ itZΔ +γ ′ itRD + itε , 
 
whereφ  = αγβ + . I name itRD  as R&D factors and its coefficientγ  can tell us the 
impact of R&D wage payment on dependent variables. Since spending on R&D can 
enhance technology, the coefficientγ  is expected to be positive. 
 Feenstra and Hanson (1999) assume a linear relationship between value-added 
prices plus effective TFP and structural variables. It is possible that the relationship 
between outsourcing and value-added prices plus effective TFP is non-linear.27 A simple 
way to check the assumption is to put a quadratic term of each outsourcing (narrow) and 
outsourcing (difference) in equation (4). For keeping itRD  unrelated to all structural 
variables, quadratic terms of outsourcing are also considered in estimating equation (2). 
As in the R&D workers’ wage regression, a dummy variable that captures grouping effects 
is also added and correlation between two-digit industries is allowed when I estimate 
equations (2) and (4).  
                                                 
26 VAitP  is value-added price and itETFP  is effective productivity. For details about how to compute these 
two variables, please see Feenstra and Hanson (1999).   
27 For focusing mainly on outsourcing, this paper only relaxes the linear assumption on outsourcing. The 
results of two-stage regression show that adding quadratic terms of outsourcing does not affect computer 
share and high-tech share.  
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To proceed in second-stage regression, there is an estimation issue addressed by 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) that needs to addressed. Since the dependent variable in the 
second-stage regression is constructed from the first-stage regression, the disturbance 
terms in the second-stage regression will be correlated across observations. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) suggest a procedure to correct the standard errors in the second-stage 
regression. Dumont et al. (2005) find their correcting method is negatively biased and 
leads to overestimation of the inferred significance. The better way to get accurate 
standard errors in the second-stage regression is to compute an unconditional variance.28 
Standard errors in the second-stage regression of this paper will follow Dumont et al’s 
(2005) idea instead of the one proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
 
3.2.2.4 Regression Results 
This chapter starts by reporting the results of the two-stage regression over the same 
period as Feenstra and Hanson (1999), which is 1979-1990 and then switches to 
1972-1979. Results of first-stage regression and second-stage regression are both reported. 
Since there are two definitions of R&D workers in this paper and R&D workers’ payment 
needs to be excluded when I compute valued-added price, each first-stage regression 
result has two Tables to illustrate the estimation results under the narrow definition and the 
broad definition of R&D workers. In addition, the working-hour data are available for 
1979-1990. Therefore, there will be four Tables, the first two of them use employment 
data and the other two illustrate the results from the regressions using working-hour data. 
For comparison purposes, this study also replicates the first-stage regression with the 
same specification as Feenstra and Hanson (1999).  
By using my data set, whose skilled labor was split into R&D workers and 
white-collar workers, there are three different first-stage regressions according to the 
discussion above, which are the basic regression, a regression including R&D factors, and 
a regression with R&D factors and quadratic terms of outsourcing. The basic regression 
includes all structural variables as independent variables. Quadratic terms of outsourcing 
                                                 
28 The author gratefully thanks Dumont et al. for providing help. 
  
67
are used to check the linearity of the relationship between outsourcing and dependent 
variables. In the results of second-stage regression, this study focuses mainly on 
outsourcing and R&D factors. The results of second-stage regression are the focus of this 
paper. The coefficients of the difference between white-collar and blue-collar workers 
show the changes of relative wage of white-collar workers. The order and brief 
description of tables is as follows: Table 7-1, 7-2, 8-1, and 8-2 are first-stage regressions 
in 1979-1990. Regressions in Table 6 use employment data and those in Table 8 use 
working-hour data. Tables 9-1 to 9-4 are second-stage regressions in 1979-1990. Then, 
Tables 10-1 and 10-2 are first-stage regressions in 1972-1979. Finally, Tables 11-1 and 
11-2 report the results of second-stage regressions in 1972-1979. To distinguish which 
splitting rule is being used in the first-stage regression, the letter “n” denotes narrow 
definition of R&D workers. That means the value-added price plus effective TFP 
computed from all primary factors, exclude the narrow definition of R&D workers. The 
letter “b” stands for broad definition of R&D workers. The letter “h” means 
working-hour data is employed.  
The question of whether outsourcing and R&D factors are non-neutral technological 
progress in 1979-1990 can be answered by Table 7. Regression 7a.1 and 7a.2 are 
replications and get almost the same results as Feenstra and Hanson (1999).29 As expected, 
all coefficients of outsourcing (narrow) are positive. When the ex ante rental price is used 
for measuring high-tech capital share, outsourcing (difference) has a significant positive 
effect on dependent variables. In addition, the coefficients on the quadratic terms of 
outsourcing (narrow) show that outsourcing (narrow) affects value-added price plus 
effective TFP non-linearly. The positive influence of outsourcing on dependent variables 
is increasing with industry’s rising outsourcing fraction.  
 
 
                                                 
29 Also, to check the difference caused by the decomposing procedure, I also try a first-stage regression 
using my data set, which excludes R&D workers when I calculate value-added price and effective TFP, 
but add R&D workers back into the regression. That is, dependent variable without R&D workers, plus 
dependent variable with only R&D workers. I get almost the same results as Feenstra and Hanson (1999) 
after putting in a grouping dummy variable. 
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Computers also can raise value-added prices plus effective TFP, if ex post rental 
prices are used for measuring, but the positive effect will vanish with different measuring 
prices. R&D factors are significantly positive in all specifications. 
When the broad definition of R&D workers is employed, the significantly positive 
effects of outsourcing (narrow) disappear, but outsourcing (difference) still has a 
significant effect on dependent variables. In Table 7-2, if ex ante rental prices are used in 
measuring high-tech capital, outsourcing (difference) still has a significant positive 
effect on dependent variables. Computers increase value-added price plus effective TFP 
if ex post rental prices are used in measuring high-tech capital shares. No matter what 
kind of high-tech capital prices are used, it does not affect the significantly positive 
coefficients of R&D factors. 
 This study also has working-hour data of white-collar workers in this period. 
Comparing the results in Table 8-1 and Table 7-1, the significant coefficients of 
outsourcing (narrow) become weak. These results are sensible since the difference of 
annual change in wages between blue-collar and white-collar workers is smaller when 
using working-hour data than using employment data. After decomposing skilled labor, 
computers are also significant if the measuring prices are ex post rental prices. R&D 
factors are significant as well. Similar to the results in Table 7-2, Table 8-2 illustrates that 
outsourcing becomes insignificant and so do computers, while R&D factors are 
significant in most specifications. 
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Table 7-1. First-Stage Regression with Narrow Definition of R&D Workers: 1979-1990 
 Dependent variable: change in value-added prices plus effective TFP  
7a.1 7n.1 7n.2 7n.3 7a.2 7n.4 7n.5 7n.6 
Independent variables:  
0.064 0.073 0.072 0.063 0.078 0.087 0.085 0.076 Outsourcing (narrow) (2.00) (2.10) (2.12) (2.22) (2.24) (2.42) (2.36) (2.53) 
0.075 0.068 0.067 0.085 0.106 0.098 0.096 0.112 Outsourcing (difference) (1.50) (1.60) (1.69) (1.67) (2.34) (2.55) (2.64) (2.35) 
2.348 2.331 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)   (2.31)    (2.15) 
-1.248 -1.182 [Outsourcing]2 (difference) (0.46)    (0.41) 
Capital services (ex post rental prices):  
0.147 0.154 0.153 0.151 Computer share (2.24) (2.31) (2.35) (2.34)  
0.067 0.053 0.052 0.051 High-tech share (difference) (0.85) (0.67) (0.64) (0.63)  
0.595 0.594 R&D factors   (2.23) (2.20)  
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):  
 0.166 0.198 0.196 0.192 Computer share   (1.46) (1.84) (1.87) (1.84) 
 -0.064 -0.093 -0.099 -0.096 High-tech share (difference)   (0.75) (1.12) (1.22) (1.20) 
 0.654 0.651 R&D factors  (2.79) (2.74) 
0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.042 Constant (119.22) (78.93) (80.47) (81.29) (108.17) (80.00) (80.77) (81.39) 
2R  0.163 0.226 0.240 0.249 0.121 0.198 0.214 0.223 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables starting with 7a are computed from all primary factors, including R&D workers, but dependent variables starting with 7n are 
computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers in the narrow definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and 
standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy 
variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All variables are measured as annual changes and 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments. 
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Table 7-2. First-Stage Regression with Broad Definition of R&D Workers: 1979-1990 
 Dependent variable: change in value-added prices plus effective TFP  
 7b.1 7b.2 7b.3 7b.4 7b.5 7b.6
Independent variables:  
0.040 0.040 0.036 0.051 0.050 0.047 Outsourcing (narrow) (1.34) (1.39) (1.41) (1.72) (1.77) (1.85) 
0.058 0.058 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.105 Outsourcing (difference) (1.35) (1.46) (1.63) (2.12) (2.24) (2.17) 
1.422 1.371 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)    (1.43)   (1.39) 
-2.358 -2.313 [Outsourcing]2 (difference) (0.88)   (0.83) 
Capital services (ex post rental prices):
0.125 0.124 0.124 Computer share (1.93) (2.04) (2.04)   
0.045 0.044 0.041 High-tech share (difference) (0.55) (0.52) (0.49)   
0.265 0.261 R&D factors    (4.83) (5.00)   
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):
0.174 0.173 0.169 Computer share   (1.49) (1.56) (1.53) 
-0.103 -0.107 -0.106 High-tech share (difference)   (1.23) (1.31) (1.31) 
0.282 0.278 R&D factors  (6.06) (6.68) 
0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 Constant (79.36) (80.89) (80.970) (83.05) (84.21) (83.76) 
2R  0.194 0.220 0.226 0.181 0.210 0.216 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables starting with 7b are computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers in the broad definition. Numbers in 
parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within 
two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All 
independent variables are measured as annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments. 
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Table 8-1. First-Stage Regression with Narrow Definition of R&D Workers Using Working-Hour Data in White-Collar 
Workers: 1979-1990 
 Dependent Variable: changes in value-added prices plus effective TFP  
 8h.1 8nh.1 8nh.2 8nh.3 8h.2 8nh.4 8nh.5 8nh.6
Independent variables:  
0.051 0.056 0.055 0.063 0.062 0.066 0.065 0.076 Outsourcing (narrow) 
(1.80) (1.91) (1.92) (2.22) (2.04) (2.19) (2.15) (2.53) 
0.063 0.053 0.053 0.085 0.087 0.075 0.074 0.112 Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.35) (1.42) (1.48) (1.67) (2.06) (2.22) (2.29) (2.35) 
2.348 2.331 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)  
(2.31)    (2.15) 
-1.248 -1.182 [Outsourcing]2 (difference) 
(0.46)    (0.41) 
Capital services (ex post rental prices):  
0.111 0.108 0.108 0.151 Computer share 
(1.91) (1.96) (1.97) (2.34) 
0.064 0.051 0.050 0.051 High-tech share (difference) 
(0.83) (0.66) (0.64) (0.63) 
0.377 0.594 R&D payment share 
(2.14) (2.20) 
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):  
 0.107 0.120 0.119 0.192 Computer share 
 (1.04) (1.27) (1.28) (1.84) 
 -0.058 -0.081 -0.085 -0.096 High-tech share (difference) 
 (0.73) (1.07) (1.15) (1.20) 
 0.459 0.651 R&D payment share 
 (3.24) (2.74) 
0.042 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 Constant 
(126.39) (87.69) (88.86) (81.29) (118.39) (89.21) (89.87) (81.39) 
2R  0.135 0.199 0.206 0.249 0.097 0.175 0.186 0.223 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445
Notes Dependent variables starting with 8h are computed by all primary factors, including R&D workers, but dependent variables starting with 8nh are 
computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers in the narrow definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and 
standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy 
variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All independent variables are measured as annual 
changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments.
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Table 8-2. First-Stage Regression with Broad Definition of R&D Workers Using Working-Hour Data of White-Collar Workers: 
1979-1990 
 Dependent variable: changes in value-added prices plus effective TFP  
 8bh.1 8bh.2 8bh.3 8bh.4 8bh.5 8bh.6
Independent variables:  
0.036 0.035 0.032 0.044 0.043 0.041 Outsourcing (narrow) 
(1.34) (1.38) (1.44) (1.67) (1.70) (1.84) 
0.047 0.047 0.074 0.066 0.065 0.092 Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.18) (1.26) (1.65) (1.81) (1.89) (2.15) 
1.309 1.266 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)  
(1.45)   (1.41) 
-2.682 -2.735 [Outsourcing]2 (difference) 
(1.13)   (1.11) 
Capital services (ex post rental prices):
0.092 0.091 0.091 Computer share 
(1.67) (1.73) (1.73) 
0.047 0.046 0.043 High-tech share (difference) 
(0.58) (0.55) (0.52) 
0.192 0.188 R&D factors 
(4.08) (4.58) 
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):
0.109 0.108 0.104 Computer share 
(1.08) (1.11) (1.08) 
-0.089 -0.092 -0.092 High-tech share (difference) 
(1.16) (1.22) (1.23) 
0.215 0.210 R&D factors 
(4.59) (5.68) 
0.041 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.042 0.042 Constant 
(87.21) (88.46) (88.84) (91.07) (92.16) (91.93) 
2R  0.176 0.194 0.203 0.163 0.185 0.194 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables starting with 8bh are computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers in the broad definition. Numbers in 
parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within 
two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All 
independent variables are measured as annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments 
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In sum, there are some important findings from the first-stage regressions in 
1979-1990. First, with the narrow definition of R&D workers, outsourcing (narrow) has 
a significantly positive effect on value-added prices plus productivity, but with the broad 
definition of R&D workers, the effect of outsourcing (narrow) is not significant. This 
does not mean that the effects of outsourcing (narrow) are uncertain, since this study also 
can not find a significant coefficient of outsourcing (narrow) in R&D workers’ wage 
regressions with the broad definition of R&D workers. One should focus on narrow 
definition of R&D workers in 1979-1990. Second, R&D factors, which subtract from 
R&D workers’ payment share in the industry’s value of shipment, increase value-added 
price plus effective TFP. Computer share also has a significantly positive effect on 
dependent variables, but rental price used for measuring capital shares also matters. 
After running the first-stage regression, the second-stage regression of the 
estimation can be done to interpret the change of primary factors’ price due to structural 
variables. I rerun Feenstra and Hanson’s (1999) second-stage regression, but employ 
working-hour data from 1979 to 1990. The results are reported in Table 9-1. It can be seen 
that none of the structural variables significantly increase non-production workers’ wages 
or significantly increase the difference between non-production and production workers’ 
wages. This implies that using employment data in non-production workers might 
overestimate the effects. Nevertheless, computer share and outsourcing (narrow) are still 
important structural variables in discussing wage inequality.   
The results of estimating the changes of blue-collar and white-collar workers’ wages 
due to outsourcing are reported in Table 9-2. The dependent variable for each 
second-stage regression comes from a first-stage regression, including R&D factors and 
quadratic terms of outsourcing as independent variables. Under the narrow definition of 
R&D workers, outsourcing (narrow) is significantly positive even when the working-hour 
data are used. If R&D workers are defined by the broad definition of R&D workers, the 
effects of outsourcing vanish. Furthermore, outsourcing increases the difference in wages 
between skilled labor and unskilled labor by raising the wages of skilled workers. As for 
other structural variables, Table 9-3 tells us that by employing number-of-employment 
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data, computers are significant, but are insignificant if working-hour data are used. R&D 
factors increase white-collar workers’ wages significantly and diminish blue-collar 
workers’ wages if the definition of R&D workers is a broad one. Table 9-4 reports the 
results of R&D factors.   
 
Table 9-1. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes Using 
Working-Hour Data in 1979-1990 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 8h 8h 8h 8h 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted factor 
prices explained by: 
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Computer 
share 
High-tech 
Share 
(difference) 
Independent variables:    
Production labor share -0.007  0.016  -0.003  0.022  
 (0.80)  (1.15)  (0.34)  (0.82)  
Non-production labor share 0.078  0.050  0.165  0.006  
 (1.74)  (1.29)  (1.88)  (0.58)  
0.085  0.034  0.168  -0.016  Difference between production 
and non-production share (1.70)  (1.12)  (1.86)  (0.72)  
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
0.104  0.047  0.080  -0.005  Difference between production 
and non-production share 
(1.89)  (1.43)  (1.03)  (0.49)  
Notes: The letters and numbers in the first row stand for their dependent variables in their first-stage 
regressions. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics.  
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Table 9-2. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes Due to Outsourcing in 1979-1990 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 7n 7n 7b 7b 7nh 7nh 7bh 7bh 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share     
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted 
factor prices explained by: 
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference) 
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Independent variables:        
Blue-collar labor share -0.009  0.026  0.008  0.024  -0.007  0.026  0.007  0.023  
 (0.68)  (1.18)  (0.91)  (1.30)  (0.67)  (1.40)  (0.92)  (1.43)  
White-collar labor share 0.129  0.049  0.041  0.052  0.102  0.032  0.037  0.038  
 (2.21)  (1.33)  (1.32)  (1.19)  (2.06)  (0.98)  (1.34)  (0.94)  
0.138  0.024  0.033  0.029  0.109  0.006  0.030  0.015  Difference between 
white-collar and 
blue-collar share (2.12)  (0.56)  (1.11)  (0.65)  (1.99)  (0.17)  (1.13)  (0.38)  
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share    
0.160  0.040  0.041  0.049  0.125  0.017  0.036  0.030  Difference between 
white-collar and 
blue-collar share (2.29)  (0.83)  (1.26)  (1.03)  (2.16)  (0.42)  (1.26)  (0.71)  
The letters and numbers in the first row stand for their dependent variables in their first-stage regressions. All dependent variables are computed 
from the regressions, including quadratic terms of outsourcing (narrow) and outsourcing (difference). Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values 
of t statistics.  
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Table 9-3. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes Due to Computers 
in 1979-1990 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 7n 7b 8nh 8bh 
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted factor prices explained by computer share in wage bills: 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
Independent variables:    
Blue-collar labor share -0.007 0.002 -0.005  0.001 
 (0.54) (0.16) (0.53)  (0.16) 
White-collar labor share 0.230 0.204 0.162  0.150 
 (2.29) (1.99) (1.93)  (1.70) 
0.237 0.202 0.167 0.148 Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (2.25) (1.96) (1.91) (1.68) 
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
0.150 0.155 0.090 0.095 Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (1.79) (1.50) (1.22) (1.07) 
Notes: The letters and numbers in the first row stand for their dependent variables in their first-stage 
regressions. All dependent variables are computed from the regressions, including quadratic terms of 
outsourcing (narrow) and outsourcing (difference). Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t 
statistics.  
 
Table 9-4. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes Due to R&D 
Factors in 1979-1990 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 7n 7b 8nh 8bh 
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted factor prices explained by R&D share in wage bill: 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
Independent variables:    
Blue-collar labor share -0.017 -0.026 -0.011  -0.019 
 (1.67) (2.74) (1.62)  (2.67) 
White-collar labor share 0.051 0.099 0.032  0.071 
 (2.00) (3.79) (1.92)  (3.60) 
0.067 0.125 0.043 0.090 Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (1.98) (3.74) (1.90) (3.56) 
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
0.058 0.058 0.041 0.087 Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (2.18) (2.18) (2.37) (3.68) 
Notes: The letters and numbers in the first row stand for their dependent variables in their first-stage 
regressions. All dependent variables are computed from the regressions including quadratic terms of 
outsourcing (narrow) and outsourcing (difference). Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t 
statistics.  
 
Theoretically speaking, the working-hour data provide more accurate information 
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about workers’ wages. Without decomposing non-production workers into R&D and 
white-collar workers, outsourcing (narrow) has a weak effect on wage inequality if 
working-hour data are employed. While after decomposing, outsourcing (narrow) is 
significant in influencing workers’ wages even if working-hour data are used. 30 
Outsourcing, computer share and R&D factors increase the wages of white-collar workers 
and then enlarge the difference in wages between skilled labor and unskilled labor. The 
broad definition may not be ideal to see the impact of outsourcing on workers in the 1980s, 
based on the fact that not only the results of R&D workers’ wages but the first-stage 
regressions are out of line with the theoretical prediction. 
The puzzle of outsourcing is why the phenomenon found in most empirical studies 
and theoretical models in the 1980s can not be seen in the 1970s. As the regression 
results of 10a.1 and 10a.2 in Table 10-1 show, outsourcing not only does not increase 
value-added prices plus effective TFP, but might actually decrease them. High-tech share 
has similar results as well. In Section 3.1, this study verified that the outsourcing 
industry in the 1970s is the unskilled-labor intensive industry and by economic intuition, 
predicts that the price of products will decrease after an increase in outsourcing in 
Section 3.2.2.3. The results in Table 10-1 accord with expectations, but are not 
significant. It might be that some R&D workers are included in white-collar workers and 
I underestimate the effects. In Table 10-2, I report the results of first-stage regression, 
under the specification of the broad definition of R&D workers. After decomposing 
skilled labor, adding R&D factors, and relaxing the linear relationship assumption, 
outsourcing (difference) influences value-added prices plus effective TFP, significantly 
negatively. 31  The quadratic term of outsourcing (difference) is also positive and 
                                                 
30 In unreported results, no matter what kind of data, working-hour data or employment data, I use and 
whether a quadratic term is included or not, outsourcing (narrow) is significant in increasing white-collar 
workers’ wages and the coefficients of difference between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers 
if the measuring price of high-tech capital is ex ante rental prices.    
31 The other reason for the insignificant coefficient of outsourcing of regressions 9b.2 and 9b.5 is about 
the dependent variable. What theoretical or intuition predict about the negative impact from outsourcing if 
the outsourcing industry is unskilled-labor-intensive, is price not price plus TFP. If I switch effective TFP 
from dependent variables back to independent variables, like estimation equation (6) in Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999), which they use it to justify their approach, the coefficients of outsourcing (difference) 
become significantly negative. 
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significant at the 90% level. The results of outsourcing (difference) tell us that, as 
predicted, outsourcing (difference) influences value-added prices plus effective TFP 
negatively in 1972-1979, but the effects decrease with the increase in outsourcing. Based 
on the results of R&D workers’ wages regressions in 1972-1979 and the comparison 
between Tables 10-1 and 10-2, the narrow definition of R&D workers seems to 
underestimate the effects of outsourcing and might not be suitable in 1972-1979. In the 
second-stage regression, the focus is the broader definition of R&D workers. 
Before reporting results on second-stage regressions, I employ employment data in 
1972-1979 and follow Feenstra and Hanson’s (1999) specification to estimate 
second-stage regression. Table 11-1 reports these results. The coefficient, as expected, on 
non-production workers is negative under outsourcing influence, but none of these 
structural variables significantly affect workers’ wages. That doesn’t mean the 
theoretical prediction is problematic. The increased wages of R&D workers might 
mislead the result. In Table 11-2, with my new specification, the wages of white-collar 
workers was fall by outsourcing (difference). That also makes the wages of white-collar 
relative to blue-collar workers decreased. This result supports my argument that the 
skilled laborers of the theoretical model in Section 2 are white-collar workers only. As 
for other structural variables, like the results in Table 11-1, they have no significant 
effects on workers’ wages. 
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Table 10-1. First-Stage Regression with Broad Definition of R&D Workers: 1972-1979 
 Dependent variable: change In value-added prices plus effective TFP  
 10a.1 10n.1 10n.2 10n.3 10a.2 10n.4 10n.5 10n.6
Independent variables:  
-0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001  -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 Outsourcing (narrow) 
(0.76) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34)  (0.99) (0.52) (0.59) (0.87) 
-0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.018  -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.55) (1.53) (1.56) (1.59)  (1.49) (1.37) (1.42) (1.68) 
0.013  0.055 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)  
(0.21)     (0.54) 
0.208  0.228 [Outsourcing]2 (difference) 
(1.50)     (1.53) 
Capital services (ex post rental prices):  
-0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008  Computer share 
(0.85) (0.88) (0.85) (0.81)  
-0.013 -0.015 -0.016 -0.016  High-tech share (difference) 
(2.05) (2.29) (2.30) (2.29)  
0.016 0.021  R&D factors  
(1.07) (0.50)  
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):  
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.008 Computer share 
 (0.29) (0.38) (0.40) (0.58) 
 -0.006 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 High-tech share (difference) 
 (0.54) (1.27) (1.34) (1.51) 
 0.023 0.049 R&D factors 
 (1.39) (1.42) 
0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072  0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 Constant 
(773.31) (371.97) (372.29) (361.05)  (764.52) (371.16) (370.87) (356.48) 
2R  0.039 0.051 0.052 0.059  0.024 0.031 0.034 0.043 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables starting with 10a are computed from all primary factors, including R&D workers but dependent variables starting with 
10n are computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers in the narrow definition. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t 
statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry groups. Besides, 
a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All independent variables are measured as 
annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments. 
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Table 10-2. First-Stage Regression with Narrow Definition of R&D Workers: 1972-1979 
 Dependent variable: change in value-added prices plus effective TFP  
 10b.1 10b.2 10b.3 10b.4 10b.5 10b.6
Independent variables:  
0.000  0.000  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.008  Outsourcing (narrow) 
(0.09) (0.11)  (0.93)  (0.62)  (0.72)  (1.12)  
-0.009  -0.009  -0.023  -0.008  -0.008  -0.023  Outsourcing (difference) 
(1.70)  (1.75)  (1.97)  (1.57)  (1.64)  (2.11)  
  0.036    0.074  [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)  
  (0.56)    (0.71)  
  0.280    0.298  [Outsourcing]2 (difference) 
  (1.88)    (1.88)  
Capital services (ex post rental prices):       
-0.007  -0.007  -0.005     Computer share 
(0.62) (0.60)  (0.50)     
-0.013  -0.013  -0.014     High-tech share (difference) 
(1.80) (1.83)  (1.88)     
 0.026  0.024     R&D factors  
 (1.49)  (1.34)     
Capital services (ex ante rental prices):       
   0.009  0.009  0.012  Computer share 
   (0.64)  (0.68)  (0.91)  
   -0.007  -0.007  -0.009  High-tech share (difference) 
   (0.84)  (0.92)  (1.24)  
    0.032  0.030  R&D factors 
    (1.71)  (1.61)  
0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  0.072  Constant 
(349.75) (350.37)  (339.55)  (350.77)  (351.29)  (338.32)  
2R  0.054  0.057  0.069  0.041  0.046  0.060  
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Notes: Dependant variables starting with 10b are computed from primary factors excluding R&D workers in the broad definition. Numbers in 
parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within 
two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All 
independent variables are measured as annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing shipments. 
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Table 11-1. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes in 1972-1979 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 9a 9a 9a 9a 
(1) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
Dependent variable:  
Change in share-weighted factor 
prices explained by: 
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Computer 
share 
High-tech 
Share 
(difference)
Independent variables:    
Production labor share 0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.004  
 (0.41)  (0.69)  (0.29)  (0.54)  
Non-production labor share -0.009  -0.023  0.000  0.002  
 (0.97)  (1.45)  (0.28)  (0.53)  
-0.009  -0.024  0.001  -0.001  Difference between production 
and non-production share (0.96)  (1.43)  (0.29)  (0.48)  
(2) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
-0.005  -0.028  -0.002  -0.011  Difference between production 
and non-production share (0.75)  (1.49)  (0.57)  (1.62)  
Notes: The letters and numbers in the first row represent their dependent variables in their first-stage 
regressions. Numbers in parentheses are absolute value of t statistics.  
 
Table 11-2. Second-Stage Regression: Estimated Factor-Price Changes 
Due to Outsourcing in 1972-1979 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 9n 9n 9b 9b 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted factor 
prices explained by: 
Outsourcing
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference) 
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
Independent variables:    
Blue-collar labor share 0.000  0.002  0.000  0.001  
 (0.42)  (0.98)  (0.37)  (0.50)  
White-collar labor share -0.007  -0.028  -0.008  -0.040  
 (0.86)  (1.68)  (1.07)  (2.10)  
-0.008  -0.030  -0.007  -0.041  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (0.86)  (1.67)  (1.03)  (2.07)  
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share 
-0.002  -0.032  -0.003  -0.043  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (0.35)  (1.57)  (0.88)  (1.90)  
Notes: All dependent variables are computed from the first-stage regressions, including quadratic terms 
of outsourcing. The letters and numbers in the first row stand for their dependent variables in their 
first-stage regressions. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute value of t statistics. 
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3.2.2.5 Including Interaction Terms 
Another setting of two-stage regression in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) is including 
interaction terms in the first-stage regression.32 The coefficients on the interaction terms 
can help us know the magnitude of non-neutral technological change.33 In this study, 
interaction terms include all structural variables interacted with the average quantities of 
blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and capital. R&D factors, which are obtained 
by equation (2), will also be included in structural variables. In addition, quadratic terms 
of outsourcing will appear in alternative regressions to check the linear relationship 
between outsourcing and value-added prices plus effective TFP. For parsimony and 
focusing on outsourcing and innovation, only the results of interaction terms of 
outsourcing and R&D factors are reported. Table 12 reports the estimation results of the 
first-stage regression with interaction terms using data from 1979 to 1990. It can be seen 
that white-collar workers and capital have a complementary relationship with 
outsourcing (narrow) in increasing productivity. The coefficients obtained from 
interaction terms of blue-collar workers and R&D factors tell us that there is a 
substitutional relationship between them in increasing productivity. Similar to the results 
of Feenstra and Hanson (1999), it is hard to explain the coefficients of the outsourcing 
(difference). About outsourcing (narrow), the results of second-stage regression from a 
first-stage regression with interaction terms are almost the same as the results from a 
first-stage regression without interaction terms. In Table 13, it can be seen that 
outsourcing (narrow) is still significant in increasing white-collar workers’ wages and 
causes wage inequality. R&D factors, however, have no effect on wages if the definition 
of R&D workers is the narrow definition. If the broad definition of R&D is used, R&D 
factors still raised the difference in wages between white-collar workers and blue-collar 
workers.  
 
                                                 
32 This specification can be derived explicitly from a translog production function. Please refer to Feenstra 
and Hanson (1999) for details. 
33 Feenstra and Hanson also remind us of the possibility that the interaction terms would be correlated 
with disturbance terms. However, there is no solution to this problem because of a lack of good 
instruments for factor quantities. It is important to interpret the coefficient estimates carefully. 
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Table 12. First-Stage Regression with Interacted Independent Variables, 1979-1990 
Regression:  Broad definition of R&D workers 
Narrow definition of 
R&D workers 
Dependent variables:  
change In value-added prices plus effective TFP 12n.1 12n.2 12b.1 12b.2 
Independent variables: Interacted with the average log quantities of:    
0.480 0.711  0.312 0.658 Outsourcing (narrow)  
(3.33) (3.20)  (2.26)  (3.03) 
0.013 0.014  0.042 0.011  Blue-collar labor 
(0.25) (0.22)  (0.92)  (0.20) 
0.099 0.114  0.036 0.084  White-collar Labor
(3.31) (3.09)  (1.06)  (2.44) 
-0.093 -0.127  -0.069 -0.110  Capital 
(2.52) (2.68)  (2.06)  (2.60) 
 -18.043   -33.145 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)  
 (1.02)  (2.11)
-0.332 -0.453  -0.253 -0.388 Outsourcing (difference)  
(1.54) (2.00)  (1.15)  (1.66) 
0.173 0.199  0.209 0.234  Blue-collar labor 
(3.31) (1.87)  (3.84) (2.62) 
-0.094 -0.109  -0.093 -0.122  White-collar Labor
(2.19) (1.37)  (1.95)  (2.01) 
-0.013 0.001  -0.048 -0.029  Capital 
(0.40) (0.03)  (1.35)  (0.91) 
 46.756   35.433 [Outsourcing]2 (difference)  
 (1.85)  (1.69)
-4.503 -4.510  -2.532 -2.419 R&D factors  
(1.54) (1.57)  (2.21)  (1.85) 
-0.824 -0.738  -0.443 -0.437  Blue-collar labor 
(2.32) (1.87)  (2.36)  (2.17) 
0.304 0.249  -0.177 -0.188  White-collar Labor
(1.22) (1.16) (1.67) (1.55)
0.894 0.859  0.634 0.618  Capital 
(1.68) (1.62) (2.71) (2.28)
0.042 0.042  0.042 0.042 Constant  
(106.64) (113.53) (101.93) (106.21)
2R   0.632 0.649  0.605  0.622 
N  445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables are computed from primary factors, excluding R&D workers. Numbers in 
parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry groups. Besides, a dummy variable, 
which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All independent 
variables are measured as annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing 
shipments. All regressions also include computer share and high-tech share, which are measured using ex 
post rental prices, as independent variables. For parsimony, only variables related to outsourcing and R&D 
factors are reported.  
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Table 13. Estimated Factor-Price Changes: 1979-1990 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 12n 12n 12b 12b 12n 12b 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share   
Dependent variable:  
change in share-weighted factor 
prices explained by: 
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing 
(difference) 
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference) 
R&D payment 
share 
R&D payment 
share 
Independent variables:      
Blue-collar labor share -0.098  0.168  -0.016  0.173  0.015  0.001  
 (2.09)  (3.30)  (0.50)  (3.44)  (0.91)  (0.06)  
White-collar labor share 0.446  -0.085  0.194  -0.144  0.038  0.080  
 (3.82)  (1.71)  (1.97)  (2.00)  (1.70)  (2.56)  
0.544  -0.253  0.210  -0.318  0.023  0.079  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (3.41)  (2.74)  (1.68)  (2.82)  (0.70)  (2.13)  
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share   
0.571  -0.059  0.301  -0.104  0.032  0.059  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share 
(3.81)  (1.24)  (2.52)  (1.69)  (1.37)  (1.94)  
Notes: All dependent variables are computed from the regressions, including quadratic terms of outsourcing (narrow) and outsourcing (difference). 
Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics. 
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Table14. First-Stage Regression with Interacted Independent Variables, 1972-1979 
Regression:  Broad definition of R&D workers 
Narrow definition of 
R&D workers 
Dependent variables:  
change In value-added prices plus effective TFP 14n.1 14n.2 14b.1 14b.2 
Independent variables: Interacted with the average log quantities of:    
0.005 0.159 0.023 0.171 Outsourcing (narrow)  (0.11) (1.60)  (0.43)  (1.85) 
0.009 0.003  0.004 0.003  Blue-collar labor (1.04) (0.48)  (0.61)  (0.43) 
-0.010 0.009  -0.006 0.010  White-collar Labor (0.96) (1.02)  (0.61)  (0.99) 
-0.002 -0.023  -0.004 -0.026  Capital (0.28) (1.61)  (0.46)  (1.81) 
 -7.783   -9.121 [Outsourcing]2 (narrow)   (1.79)  (2.02)
0.062 0.185  0.055 0.166 Outsourcing (difference)  (1.17) (1.26)  (1.06)  (1.07) 
0.018 0.044  0.027 0.057  Blue-collar labor (1.83) (2.00)  (2.25)  (2.47) 
-0.011 -0.026  -0.021 -0.044  White-collar Labor (1.35) (2.23)  (1.99)  (3.31) 
-0.016 -0.043  -0.018 -0.044  Capital (1.53) (1.49)  (1.62)  (1.44) 
 -3.514   -4.401 [Outsourcing]2 (difference)   (1.36)  (1.43)
0.434 0.380  0.293 0.160 R&D factors  (1.34) (1.24)  (1.26)  (0.90) 
-0.110 -0.091  0.015 0.016  Blue-collar labor (1.32) (1.22)  (0.26)  (0.27) 
0.066 0.060  0.027 0.002  White-collar Labor (1.03) (0.91)  (0.68) (0.06)
-0.015 -0.016  -0.053 -0.029  Capital (0.36) (0.33) (1.12) (0.78)
0.072 0.072  0.072 0.072 Constant  (495.44) (456.58) (476.75) (435.63)
2R   0.218 0.249  0.260  0.295 
N  445 445 445 445
Notes: Dependent variables are computed from primary factors excluding R&D workers. Numbers in 
parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics and standard errors in all regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and correlation in the errors within two-digit industry groups. In addition, a dummy 
variable, which is log of the 1980 CPS industry classification, is also included in each regression. All 
independent variables are measured as annual changes and weighted by average industry share of all 
manufacturing shipments. All regressions also include computer share and high-tech share, which are 
measured using ex post rental prices, as independent variables. For parsimony, only variables related to 
outsourcing and R&D factors are reported.  
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Table 15. Estimated Factor-Price Changes: 1972-1979 
Dependent variables in 
first-stage regressions: 14n 14n 14b 14b 14n 14b 
(1) Employing ex post rental prices for computer share and high-tech share   
Dependent variable:  
Change in Share-weighted Factor 
Prices explained by: 
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference) 
Outsourcing 
(narrow) 
Outsourcing
(difference)
R&D payment 
share 
R&D payment 
share 
Independent variables:      
Blue-collar labor share 0.003  0.019  0.002  0.025  0.000  -0.002  
 (0.74)  (1.97)  (0.59)  (2.54)  (0.03)  (0.64)  
White-collar labor share -0.007  -0.051  -0.013  -0.077  -0.002  0.000  
 (0.66)  (1.79)  (0.99)  (2.28)  (0.48)  (0.02)  
-0.010  -0.070  -0.016  -0.102  -0.002  0.002  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share (0.74)  (1.90)  (0.99)  (2.44)  (0.30)  (0.15)  
(2) Employing ex ante rental prices for computer share and high-tech share   
-0.044  -0.066  -0.042  -0.105  -0.005  -0.005  Difference between white-collar 
and blue-collar share 
(1.44)  (1.87)  (1.69)  (3.14)  (0.93)  (0.39)  
Notes: All dependent variables are computed from the regressions, including quadratic terms of outsourcing (narrow) and outsourcing (difference). 
Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics. 
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This study also employs data from 1972 to 1979 to estimate the first-stage 
regression with interaction terms. In Table 14, it can be seen that there is a 
complimentary relationship between blue-collar workers and outsourcing (difference) 
and a substitutional relationship between white-collar workers and outsourcing 
(difference) in affecting productivity. The results of Tables 12 and 13 show that the labor 
intensity of the outsourcing industry determines not only the effects of outsourcing on 
product prices, but also the way structural variables progress industry productivity. R&D 
factors have the expected positive sign when they are interacted with white-collar 
workers, but the coefficients are not significant. Turning to the second-stage regression, 
the only significant result is outsourcing (difference) in Table 15. The positive 
coefficient on blue-collar workers and negative one on white-collar workers makes the 
relative wage of white-collar to blue-collar decrease.  
 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The argument of whether outsourcing causes wage deterioration of unskilled labor 
has been supported by the evidence proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999). However, an unsolved puzzle of outsourcing is why the 
effects of outsourcing on wage inequality in most empirical papers found in the 1980s 
can not be seen in the 1970s. Two additional questions arise from this puzzle. First, did 
all skilled labor’s wages become worse because of outsourcing? Second, is the falling 
relative wage of skilled labor to unskilled labor caused by increasing wages of unskilled 
labor or decreasing wages of skilled labor? 
By borrowing the framework of international fragmentation from Jones and 
Kierzkowski (2001) and Jones (2005), this study finds that the change in the 
skilled/unskilled labor ratio of the outsourcing industry is a possible explanation for the 
outsourcing puzzle in the 1970s. If the outsourcing industry is relatively 
skilled-labor-intensive compared to the non-outsourcing industry, the relative wage of 
skilled labor increases, but if the outsourcing industry is relatively 
unskilled-labor-intensive, the relative wage of skilled labor decreases.  
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This study tests the theoretical explanation empirically. To answer the additional 
questions of the outsourcing puzzle, this paper adopts the idea of quality ladders and 
product cycles and considers laborers who conduct innovation or R&D to be a different 
kind of labor force than other skilled laborers. Therefore, there are three kinds of labor in 
this study - R&D workers, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers. By employing 
the NBER Productivity Database and March CPS data to construct a new data set with 
three kinds of labor and regression estimation to check the influence of structural 
variables, including outsourcing on workers’ wages, I find that R&D workers always 
benefit from outsourcing. The relative wage of white-collar workers was increasing 
because of outsourcing in the 1980s, but decreasing in the 1970s. The falling relative 
wage of white-collar workers in the 1970s was caused by the decreasing wages of 
white-collar workers.  
This paper focuses on the wages of workers and not their welfare. However, wages 
just are part of the influence of outsourcing on labor. The welfare issues will be pursued 
in next chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BEYOND THE WAGE INEQUALITY, THE IMPACT OF 
OUTSOURCING ON THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Beyond wage inequality, there are other important issues related to outsourcing 
that have been ignored by researches. The stability of laborers’ jobs, for example, could 
be affected by outsourcing as well. If outsourcing decreases the demand for unskilled 
labor, the consequence after reducing wages is layoff. As for workers, low wage means 
less income but layoff means a loss of income and a search for new employment. 
Unemployment is not only a personal problem but has social consequences. Thus, the 
effects of outsourcing are more complicated if we also take job stability into 
consideration. 
Also, the effects on job stability from outsourcing lead to the changes in the 
hiring of new workers. Workers with different background may face different changes in 
the demand for their labor. Outsourcing enterprises’ preferences for employees play an 
important role. According to Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Hsu (2006), outsourcing 
decreased the wages of unskilled labor in the 1980s. Therefore, after outsourcing, 
employers can choose to retain original unskilled workers with lower pay or lay off 
current workers and hire new ones with lower pay. Their decisions also influence other 
employers who do not outsource. First, since outsourcing firms decrease their demand 
for unskilled labor, non-outsourcing firms can pay less to hire unskilled workers with the 
same quality or higher. As for unskilled jobs, which require physical strength, age is an 
important factor to be considered when hiring. Besides, the role of union is also 
important. Union usually controls by the labor with more tenure or seniority. When 
outsourcing firms need to lay off workers, laborers who have less tenure have higher 
probability to be laid off.       
Second, the wages of skilled labor are increased by outsourcing. Skilled workers 
may not be attracted to employers who do not decide to outsource. As for skilled 
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workers, normally a worker’s wage increases with seniority since experience is more 
important than physical strength for these jobs. Outsourcing industries become more 
attractive to skilled workers who have higher seniority because of the increasing wage in 
outsourcing industries. Thus, the average age of skilled labor in outsourcing industries 
may be higher than the one of the industries that do not outsource. Also, education level 
is an important determinant of wages for skilled workers. In sum, outsourcing may 
influence the average age and years of completed education of workers in both 
outsourcing and non-outsourcing industries.         
Outsourcing can also affect women’s labor force participation. Usually, women 
spend more time on domestic activities than men do, and these activities are their 
opportunity costs of working for a paid job. If outsourcing increases the wages, it 
increases the probability for a woman to get a salary which is higher than her reservation 
price for joining the labor market. Skilled workers or non-production workers are those 
groups favored by outsourcing in the 1980s. I expect a positive effect on women’s 
participation in outsourcing industries.  
Thus, this study focuses on the employment impacts from outsourcing. I discuss 
not only the total number of employment, but also the job stability and inflows and 
outflows between different groups of labor. Following Ureta (1992) and Diebold et al 
(1997), I employ Current Population Survey (CPS) data to evaluate the job retention 
rates to understand the effects of outsourcing on job stability of workers during the 
1980s. Also, the discussion above tells us that outsourcing can affect laborers’ inflows 
and outflow across industries by age, education year and gender. Examining the changes 
of workers’ demographic characteristic across manufacturing industries to see whether 
the changes can be explained by outsourcing can help us to see the movements between 
different groups of labor.  
After examining the changes of employment, this paper shows some possible 
cases for the movements of labor due to increasing outsourcing. Thus, for understanding 
the directions and features of laborers’ inflows and outflows, this paper needs to examine 
the effects of outsourcing on average age, education, the gender-ratio, and tenure years 
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for all kinds of workers. The data on outsourcing are crucial to this study. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) use the ratio of estimated imports of intermediate inputs in the total 
purchase of non-energy material to proxy outsourcing. This study follows their 
estimation methods. Also, Hsu (2006) finds that the influence from outsourcing on the 
skilled labor who conducts R&D is different from the skilled labor who works for 
manufacturing production. Following Hsu’s study, this paper separates skilled labor into 
white-collar workers who work in manufacturing, and R&D workers who conduct 
innovation of new products.  
 
4.2 The Questions 
In the labor market, outsourcing affects labor by shifting labor demand not only 
from a source country to a host country, but also from the industries whose outsourcing 
fractions are comparatively higher to the industries whose outsourcing fractions are 
comparatively lower. I name the first group of industries high outsourcing industries and 
the second group of industries low outsourcing industries. The influence of outsourcing 
on changes in labor demand can be known by testing wage changes. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) employ two stage regressions to estimate the change in laborers’ wages 
due to the changes in the outsourcing fraction. They find the wages of production 
workers were decreased by outsourcing and the wages of non-production workers were 
increased in the 1980s. Hsu (2006) improves Feenstra and Hanson’s workers by using 
working-hour data and splitting skilled labor into two categories. His results show that 
outsourcing decreased the wages of blue-collar workers and increased the wages of 
white-collar workers in the 1980s.  
Thus, previous literature shows us what the change of wage will be, but the 
change of wage can provide us little information when laborers are mobile across 
industries. We also need some information about the change of employment. That is the 
impact on inflows and outflows of employment in manufacturing industries from 
outsourcing. Intuitively, the outflows in high outsourcing industries are unskilled 
workers who have high wages relative to their unskilled counterparts in the developing 
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countries. Under the assumption of full employment, the outflows of employment in 
those high outsourcing industries also means an inflow of workers into the low 
outsourcing industries. On the other hand, outsourcing can be thought of as a technology 
improvement, which pushes industry toward skilled labor intensive production. Thus, the 
inflows of high outsourcing industries could be skilled labor, which also are the outflows 
of employment in those low outsourcing industries.  
Since the preferences of employers of those outsourcing industries are unknown, 
the inflows and outflows described above may not happen if the employers in high 
outsourcing industries prefer their original workers. Thus, the outflows of unskilled labor 
in high outsourcing industries might not be seen and inflows of unskilled labor in low 
outsourcing industries are young workers who just join labor market. The inflows of 
skilled labor in high outsourcing industries might also disappear if the employers do not 
like the labor the other places. This can be tested empirically. 
In the unreported results of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), they find that during the 
periods 1972-1979 and 1979-1990 outsourcing is positively correlated with the change 
in the relative employment of skilled labor. These results are consistent with most 
theoretical thinking that outsourcing industries, after outsourcing their basic part of 
production, which is mainly done by unskilled labor, concentrate on their advanced part 
of production, which needs more skilled workers. However, the unreported results only 
answer half of the questions above. The facts behind their results could be that compared 
to low outsourcing industries, high outsourcing industries hired more skilled workers, or 
they did not hire more skilled labor but laid off lots of unskilled workers.   
Thus, I decompose the unreported results of relative employment of skilled labor 
in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and report them in table 16. The significant negative 
relationship between employment-change of unskilled workers and the changes of 
outsourcing is expected. Outsourcing requires high outsourcing industries to hire less 
unskilled labor than low outsourcing industries. The insignificantly negative correlation 
between outsourcing and employment of skilled labor, however, is surprising. Although 
high outsourcing industries have higher relative employment of skilled labor, they did 
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not hire more skilled labor than low outsourcing industries did. The reason that high 
outsourcing industries have higher relative employment of skilled labor is that they hire 
much fewer unskilled workers than low outsourcing industries.  
After describing the change in the amount of employment, the information on 
inflows and outflows of employment across industries is still scant. The negative results 
in table 16 could be caused by a large outflow of employment. For outsourcing, 
employers might lay off workers due to decreasing labor demand. In this case, the job 
retention rates of high outsourcing industries are lower than those of low outsourcing 
industries. On the other hand, the negative results could be caused by a low inflow of 
employment. After knowing the change of retention rates, comparing the average tenure 
years can help us determine which case it is. If high outsourcing industries hire more 
workers than the other industries and their retention rates are lower than others, their 
average tenure should be lower than low outsourcing industries. Outflow of employment 
cause the negative coefficient in table 16. Otherwise, if high outsourcing industries have 
higher average tenure and higher retention rates, it means that high outsourcing 
industries retain their original workers but do not hire new workers. The low inflow of 
employment is the main factor causing high outsourcing industries to lose more workers 
than low outsourcing industries in the 1980s. 
       .  
Table 16. The Change of Employment in the 1980s  
 Relative Empoyment of Skilled Labor 
The Changes of  
Unskilled Workers 
The Changes of  
Skilled Workers 
outsourcing 0.891  -1.290  -0.397  
 (3.04) (2.83) (0.79) 
output 0.098  0.479  0.528  
 (3.83) (2.73) (3.06) 
constant 0.056  -0.222  -0.092  
 (4.06) (11.02) (4.06) 
2R  0.193  0.449  0.442  
N 445 445 445 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of t statistics. All regressions are weighted by the 
industry share in total manufacturing employment and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  
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 In addition to laborers’ tenure, other questions like “Which group of unskilled 
workers had been laid off and which group of skilled labor had been hired because of 
outsourcing?” are also interesting. CPS data, however, can not tell us whether the 
workers leave or had been hired by their present employer because of outsourcing. 
Nevertheless, we can use average age, years of completed education and gender-ratios of 
industries to see the inflows and outflows. Since outsourcing firms are willing to pay 
more for skilled labor and pay less for unskilled labor, skilled laborers with high quality 
may want to flow into outsourcing industries and unskilled labor with high quality may 
want to flow out of outsourcing industries. Years of completed education can be thought 
of as a signal of laborers’ quality for skilled labor. Examining the average years of 
completed education among manufacturing industries by running a regression with 
outsourcing as an explanatory variable can tell us whether the inflow and outflow of 
skilled labor happened. A positive relationship between the change of average years of 
education and outsourcing of skilled labor is expected. 
Besides laborers’ years of education, age is another important signal for quality. 
Especially for skilled labor, seniority and experience are usually an essential requirement. 
The change of average ages of industries can tell us whether employers hire young 
workers. A positive relationship is expected in a regression of average age of skilled 
labor with outsourcing. Young workers have more physical strength than old workers. 
Most occupations for unskilled labor require physical strength. If employers evaluate 
unskilled labor’s quality by their physical strength, a negative relationship between the 
change of average age and the change of outsourcing can be seen when we estimate the 
effects of outsourcing on unskilled labor. Besides, Young workers might have more years 
of education than old workers do. Another expected negative effect of outsourcing is on 
the change of years of education of unskilled labor.   
Women are usually the ones who sacrifice their opportunity to work by staying at 
home. Thus, the expenditure of doing housework and taking care of children becomes a 
part of the reservation price for women to join labor force. If the expenditure is high or 
the working wage is low, some women might leave the labor force. On the contrary, if 
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the expenditure is low and wage is higher than the expenditure, those women can hire 
someone to do their housework and join the labor market. If outsourcing increases the 
wages, it also increases the probability for a woman to get a salary which is higher than 
her reservation price for joining the labor market. Thus, it might increase the labor 
supply. In figure 12, suppose normally everyone has the same basic reservation price 
when considering whether joining the labor market, which is 0w . When the wage is 
over 0w , men and women who do not need to do housework join the labor market. If the 
wage is over 0w′ , those women who need to stay at home to do housework can join the 
labor market and the total labor supply curve moves to the right. Thus, if an increase in 
outsourcing can increase the demand of labor, it is possible that the women’s labor force 
participation can be increased. In the figure 10, the equilibrium quantity of labor moves 
from 1l  to 2l and the wage moves from 1w  to 2w  because of the increasing 
outsourcing. The regressions of gender-ratio are used to examine this effect of 
outsourcing. I expect a significant negative relationship between the change of 
gender-ratio and the change of outsourcing. This means that women’s participation is 
increasing in outsourcing industries in the 1980s.  
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Figure 12. Labor market  
 
4.3 Data 
Following Ureta (1992) and Diebold, et al. (1997), this paper uses 1983, 1987, 
and 1991 CPS tenure supplements included in January CPS. The job tenure question on 
the CPS is “How long has …been working continuously for his present employer (or 
self-employed)?” A respondent’s answer is his or her tenure. January CPS data also have 
information regarding age, years of education completed, and sex of respondents. A 
gender-ratio stands for the male-female ratio of an industry.    
Since Hsu (2006) finds that it is necessary to separate skilled labor into 
white-collar and R&D workers when we investigate the impact of outsourcing on labor, 
this study separates skilled labor following Hsu’s paper. Hsu (2006) also mention about 
the problem when we separate skilled labor into white-collar and R&D workers basing 
on CPS occupation classification, which is that even if a respondent’s occupation in CPS 
data tells us that he or she should be classified as R&D worker, he or she is not 
necessarily doing R&D. By using two definitions of R&D workers, which are narrow 
and broad definition of R&D workers, this problem can be improved. 
The first is a narrow definition of R&D workers, includes those occupations in 
w  
l  
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which a high proportion of workers are doing R&D. In the 1980 CPS classification of 
occupations, they are computer scientists (64-65), mathematical scientists (68), and 
natural scientists (69-82). The second group is a broad definition of R&D workers that 
include both narrow definition of R&D workers and occupations in which a lower 
proportion of workers are doing R&D. In the 1980 CPS classification, they are scientists 
(64-65, 68, 69-83), engineers (44-62), economists (166), and designers (185). I also 
consider educational qualification. Respondents who are R&D workers must have 
finished at least high school. The rest of skilled workers are white-collar workers. The 
regression results under a decomposition rule of the narrow definition of R&D workers 
can be thought of as lower-bound results and under the broad definition of R&D workers 
can be thought of as upper-bound results. The broad definition of R&D may cause 
estimation problems if a considerable fraction of engineers, economists, and designers 
are not doing R&D jobs. The narrow definition of R&D may cause underestimation if in 
fact most engineers, economists, and designers are R&D workers. Thus, comparing 
results from both specifications can give us a better answer to the questions. 
Table 17 summarizes the data of average age, gender-ratio, average education 
years, average tenure years, outsourcing and real output across manufacturing industries 
in these three years. The average age of American workers in manufacturing industries 
was about forty in the 1980s. The average age of skilled workers was a little higher than 
that of their less skilled counterpart, but the differentials are small. According to the 
numbers of gender-ratio category, blue-collar jobs are mainly held by men. Most 
working women are white-collar workers. Comparing the gender-ratios of each year, it 
can be seen that the gender-ratios of blue-collar workers barely change, but the 
gender-ratios of white-collar workers decrease year by year. This means that relative to 
men, more women join the white-collar labor market. Blue-collar jobs, however, 
requiring more physical strength which limit women’s participation, have barely 
changed their gender-ratios. 
R&D workers have the most years of completed education. Also, white-collar 
workers need more educational training than blue-collar workers. Generally speaking, 
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regardless of skill level, laborers’ average years of completed education increased year 
by year, and average tenure did not change much from 1983 to 1991 for both unskilled 
and skilled labor. Skilled laborers did not have more continuous years of service with 
their present employers than less skilled laborers did. 
According to Feenstra and Hanson (1996), outsourcing fractions are measured as 
the share of imported intermediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy materials. 
To estimate imported intermediate inputs requires data of material purchases from 
Census of Manufactures and import data from NBER International Trade Data. An 
estimated imported intermediate for a given industry is that the value of input purchase 
from each supplier industry times the ratio of imports to total consumption, which is 
imports plus shipments, in the supplier industry, summed over all supplier industries.34 
They measure outsourcing as the share of imported intermediate input in the total 
purchase of non-energy material. Since there is no data that could tell us the imported 
intermediate input, they use alternative estimated imported data. The formula is, 
 
(51)    
purchases materialenergy -non total
EIM
gOutsourcin jj =    
               
where iEIM is estimated imported intermediate input for manufacture j. iEIM  
computed as   
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34 Author gratefully thanks Feenstra and Hanson for providing the data and help.  
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Table 17. Summary Statistics  
  Blue-Collar Skilled White-Collar 
(Broad Definition of R&D) 
Year  Ave. Max. Min. S.D. Ave. Max. Min. S.D. Ave. Max. Min. S.D. 
1983 Age 39.37 54 
(381) 
28.64 
(190) 
1.91 40.64 49.33 
(140) 
28.5 
(201) 
2.96 40.93 63 
(261) 
28.5 
(201) 
3.23 
 Gender-Ratio 0.73 1 
(201) 
0.09 
(151) 
0.21 0.64 1 
(381) 
0 
(361) 
0.10 0.59 1 
(381; 
201) 
0 
(261; 
231) 
0.10 
 Education Years 11.31 13.14 
(181) 
9.56 
(222) 
0.76 13.68 15.14 
(181) 
11.58 
(111) 
0.67 13.40 15 
(381) 
11.58 
(111) 
0.58 
 Tenure Years 10.04 
 
16.56 
(270) 
5.45 
(190) 
2.31 10.59 21.5 
(261) 
2 
(361) 
2.52 10.61 36 
(261) 
2 
(361) 
2.70 
              
1987 Age 40.05 46.57 
(281) 
33.6 
(381) 
1.78 40.97 46.05 
(251) 
34.71 
(171) 
1.93 40.93 47.22 
(251) 
34.76 
(`171) 
2.07 
 Gender-Ratio 0.74 1 0.12 
(151) 
0.23 0.62 1 
(201) 
0 
(141) 
0.11 0.58 1 
(201) 
0 
(141) 
0.10 
 Education Years 11.41 13.16 
(380) 
8.67 
(252) 
0.70 13.91 16.10 
(181) 
11.86 
(230) 
0.70 13.69 15.90 
(181) 
11.86 
(230) 
0.61 
 Tenure Years 10.42 15.62 
(310) 
5.8 
(381) 
2.17 10.84 18 
(141) 
6.60 
(281) 
2.31 10.67 18 
(141) 
4.33 
(112) 
2.37 
              
1991 Age 39.79 48.14 
(140) 
29.86 
(201) 
1.99 40.76 48.58 
(162) 
30 
(361) 
2.35 41.14 49.65 
(162) 
32.33 
(361) 
2.54 
 Gender-Ratio 0.73 1 0 
(381) 
0.18 0.61 1 0 
(261) 
0.11 0.56 1 0 
(261) 
0.11 
 Education Years 11.63 13.11 
(321) 
9.71 
(220) 
0.71 13.96 16 
(220) 
12.75 
(261) 
0.64 13.70 16 
(220) 
12.29 
(272) 
0.55 
 Tenure Years 10.25 16.68 
(340) 
5.23 
(201) 
2.15 10.15 16.82 
(272) 
3.40 
(141) 
2.31 10.10 15.86 
(272) 
3.40 
(141) 
2.36 
Notes: Numbers of Ave. are the average numbers of total manufacturing industries. Numbers of Max. and Min. are the highest and lowest average 
statistics of all manufacturing industries. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding 1980 CPS industrial classification codes. If there are more than 
two industries have the same average age, education, and gender-ratios, the industrial code is omitted.  
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Table 17. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
  White-Collar 
(Narrow Definition of R&D) 
R&D 
(Broad Definition of R&D) 
R&D 
(Narrow Definition of R&D) 
Year  Ave. Max. Min. S.D. Ave. Max. Min. S.D. Ave. Max. Min. S.D. 
1983 Age 40.71 49.33 
(140) 
28.5 
(201) 
2.92 40.05 57 
(110) 
23.5 
(121) 
6.15 38.24 58.5 
(210) 
22 
(121; 
180) 
10.11 
 Gender-Ratio 0.63 1 
(381; 
201) 
0 
(361) 
0.10 0.84 1 0 0.28 0.73 1 0 o.34 
 Education Years 13.62 15.05 
(251) 
11.58 
(111) 
0.65 15.19 18 
(190) 
12 
(281) 
1.08 15.68 18 12 
 
1.26 
 Tenure Years 10.63 21.5 
(261) 
2 
(361) 
2.46 10.98 27 
(380) 
1 
(121) 
5.15 9.41 32 
(270) 
1 
(310) 
7.70 
              
1987 Age 40.93 47 
(251) 
34.71 
(171) 
1.94 40.04 52.25 
(250) 
24 
(281) 
5.03 40.95 62 
(120) 
26 
(130) 
7.16 
 Gender-Ratio 0.62 1 
(201) 
0 
(141) 
0.11 0.87 1 0 
(381) 
0.19 0.85 1 
(120) 
0 
(191) 
0.28 
 Education Years 13.85 15.91 
(181) 
11.86 
(230) 
0.67 15.22 17.5 
(251) 
12 
(381) 
0.86 15.53 18 
(200; 
251 
12 1.41 
 Tenure Years 10.78 18 
(141) 
4.33 
(112) 
2.33 11.18 26.5 
(112) 
1 
(281) 
4.61 11.32 26.5 
(112) 
1 
(281) 
6.04 
              
1991 Age 40.91 48.58 
(162) 
30 
(361) 
2.36 39.61 59 
(142) 
23 
(361) 
6.01 36.81 
 
50 
(292) 
23 
(101) 
4.83 
 Gender-Ratio 0.60 1 0 
(261) 
0.11 0.85 1 0 
(191; 
291) 
0.18 0.74 1 0 0.22 
 Education Years 13.90 16 
(220) 
12.75 
(261) 
0.61 15.46 18 
(121) 
12 
(231) 
0.82 15.81 18 
(121; 
300) 
13 
(280) 
1.02 
 Tenure Years 10.21 16.82 
(272) 
3.40 
(141) 
2.33 10.09 30 
(142) 
1 
(251; 
281) 
4.9 8.8 23 
(191) 
 
2 
(121; 
372) 
4.93 
Notes: Numbers of Ave. are the average numbers of total manufacturing industries. Numbers of Max. and Min. are the highest and lowest average 
statistics of all manufacturing industries. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding 1980 CPS industrial classification codes. If there are more than 
two industries have the same average age, education, and gender-ratios, the industrial code is omitted. 
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Table 17. Summary Statistics (Continued)  
 Outsourcing  Output 
(millions of dollars) 
 Ave. Max. Min. S.D.  Ave. Max. Min. S.D. 
1982 0.089 0.457 
(381) 
0 
(141; 
230) 
0.069 1982 28171 124058 
(351) 
1318 
(381) 
25075 
1987 0.116 0.533 
(381) 
0 
(230) 
0.086 1987 34387 205923 
(351) 
1221 
(381) 
33775 
1992 0.126 0.57 
(381) 
0 
(230) 
0.094 1991 35117 188046 
(351) 
1268 
(381) 
34574 
Notes: Numbers in output are real value of shipment. The based year is 1987. Numbers of Ave. are the 
average numbers of total manufacturing industries. Numbers of Max. and Min. are the highest and lowest 
average statistics of all manufacturing industries. Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding 1980 CPS 
industrial classification codes. 
 
where ijIIM  is the purchased flow from manufacture j to i. jSM is the import share of 
manufacture j which is  
 
(53)    
jj
j
j shpimp
imp
SM +=                                              
 
where jimp is the total imports of manufacture j and jshp is the total shipment cost of 
manufacture j.  
The data of real output come from the NBER Productivity Database [Bartelsman 
and Gray, 1996]. Using the NBER Productivity Database deflator, this study deflates the 
value of industry shipments. It can be seen that industry, “watch, clocks, and clockwork 
operated devices,” whose code is 381, has lowest real output and highest outsourcing 
fraction in all these three years. It can be realized that most of the production of this 
industry had been shipped to other countries.       
One other important aspect of this table is that the differentials across 
manufacturing industries are considerable for all variables. In this study, I use 
outsourcing as an explanatory variable to see how much changes across sections can be 
explained by outsourcing. However, data sources of outsourcing are different from the 
ones of age, education, and tenure. To capture the features and backgrounds of laborers 
in the 1980s, CPS data are employed, whose tenure supplements are only available in 
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1983, 1987, and 1991. Outsourcing fractions, which estimated by imported intermediate 
purchase, are only available in the years 1982, 1987, and 1992. Since the information of 
labor in this study derives from January CPS data, there is no question about the year 
1983 and 1987. The problems of using data of CPS 1991 and Census of Manufactures 
1992, however, are unavoidable.     
The other important issue to consider when combing information from different 
datasets is industrial codes. Since NBER Productivity Database comes from the Annual 
Survey Manufactures (ASM), which is coded by 1972 or 1987 Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC), it is necessary to convert them into 1980 CPS Industrial 
Classification (CIC). This can be done by using the converting bridge between 1972 SIC 
and 1980 CIC provided by the Bureau of the Census. To convert SIC to CIC, some 
industries classifications in the 1980 CIC have to be merged. Those are census code 122 
(merging with 121), 211 (merging with 210), 232 (merging with 241), 301 (merging with 
300), 322 (merging with 321), 332 (merging with 331), 350 (merging with 342), 362 
(merging with 370), 382 (merging with 381), 390 (merging with 391), and 392 (merging 
with 391). The total number of manufacturing industries is 72. 
Therefore, we have two sources that tell us the employment share of each 
industry in total manufacturing. One is from CPS data and the other is the ASM. For 
checking the consistency, this paper computes those shares in each industry in 1983, 
1987, and 1991 and draws them together. Figures 13, 14, and 15 are each industry’s 1983, 
1987, and 1991 employment share in total manufacturing employment, respectively. 
These two data sources are comparable. The industries with higher employment shares 
are “Apparel and Accessories, except knit” “Printing, Publishing, & Allied Industries, 
except Newspapers,” “Machinery, except Electrical,” “Electrical Machinery, Equipment, 
and Supplies, n.e.c.,” and “Aircraft and Parts.” Thus, using the industrial information in 
CPS data is as accurate as ASM. 
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Figure 13. 1983 Industry's Employment Share in Total Manufacturing Employment 
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Figure 14. 1987 Industry's Employment Share in Total Manufacturing Employment 
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Figure 15. 1991 Industry's Employment Share in Total Manufacturing Employment 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, I examine the impact of outsourcing on average age, gender-ratios, 
and education workers in each industry. Then, I examine the influence of outsourcing on 
job retention rates. There are two periods, 1983-1987 and 1987-1991, studied. After 
pooling these two periods together, the number of observations increases to 144. There 
are two types of regressions employed when this study discusses each kind of labor in 
each topic. The first one is cross-section and time-series model with random effects. The 
other is ordinary regression including a time dummy. All regressions in this paper are 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning 
and ending year. Since information about R&D workers can not be found in some 
manufacturing industries, their age, gender-ratios, and education-years regressions are 
ignored. The retention rate can still be computed by using CPS data. The reasons and 
procedure are discussed below.    
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4.4.1 Age 
According to table 18, generally speaking, an increase in industries’ outsourcing 
increases the average age of both skilled and unskilled labor. The results are expected for 
skilled labor. Outsourcing increased the wage of skilled labor which increases the hiring 
of skilled worker with more seniority and experience. The average age increased with 
time. Since the demand for unskilled labor was decreasing, the increasing average age in 
unskilled labor suggests that either the outsourcing enterprises retained the original old 
workers and laid off young worker or they hire new old workers with lower pay. Also, 
increasing output hinders the age accumulation. The possible reason is the new coming 
workers. Increasing output also means increasing labor demand. If the new hire are 
young workers, the average age will decrease. 
  
Table 18. Changes in Workers’ Average Age 
 Blue-Collar Skilled White-Collar 
(Broad Definition in R&D)
White-Collar 
(Narrow Definition in R&D)
SoΔ  12.739 16.870 15.848 15.830 10.642 10.041 16.019 15.920 
 (2.31) (2.69) (3.45) (3.42) (1.97) (1.85) (3.52) (3.47)
Δ ln(y) -3.892 -5.123 -4.103 -3.952 -2.563 -2.292 -3.732 -3.465 
 (4.67) (4.54) (5.22) (4.73) (2.73) (2.34) (4.81) (4.19) 
D   0.961  -0.198  -0.671  -0.479 
  (1.21)  (-0.34)  (-0.97)  (0.82)
Constant -1.180 -1.609 0.386 0.461 0.401 0.716 0.401 0.601 
 (2.38) (2.91) (1.23) (1.13) (1.12) (1.48) (1.28) (1.49)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes: Δ ln(y) is the change in log real output. SoΔ  is the change in outsourcing. D is the time 
dummy. When time dummy equals to one, it means the time period in 1983-1987. Regressions without 
time dummy are estimated by using cross-section and time-series model with random effects. Numbers 
in parentheses are the absolute values t statistics. All dependent and independent variables are 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning and ending 
year. 
 
As for the inflows and outflows between high and low outsourcing industries, 
according to the results in table 18, the outflows of employment from high to low 
outsourcing industries could be young unskilled labor and the inflows between high and 
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low outsourcing industries could be old skilled labor. It explains that employers evaluate 
unskilled labor by their ages, which are proxies of physical strength and evaluate skilled 
labor by their seniorities, which usually increased with ages. Thus, the remaining 
question for the results in table 3 is whether the original workers were replaced by those 
new workers. This question is analyzed below by the regression results of job tenure.  
 
4.4.2 Gender-Ratios 
As for the impact of outsourcing on Gender-Ratios of outsourcing industries, in 
table 19, the only significant influence can be found in white-collar workers. Expectedly, 
more women joined the labor market because of the increasing wages of white-collar 
workers. Notice that the significant coefficients become weak if engineers, economists, 
and designers are included in white-collar labor. This result is not unexpected because 
engineers are the major occupation composing the difference between the broad 
definition and the narrow definition of R&D workers, and few women choose these 
occupations as a career.  
 
Table 19. Changes in Workers’ Gender-Ratios 
 Blue-Collar Skilled White-Collar 
(Broad Definition in R&D)
White-Collar 
(Narrow Definition in R&D)
SoΔ  0.094 0.089 -0.114 -0.102 -0.480 -0.476 -0.223 -0.213 
 (0.63) (0.59) (0.57) (0.51) (2.15) (2.10) (1.07) (1.01)
Δ ln(y) -0.012 -0.010 -0.037 -0.043 0.000 -0.002 -0.026 -0.030 
 (0.47) (-0.37) (1.08) (1.19) (0.01) (0.04) (0.70) (0.79) 
D   -0.006  0.014  0.005  0.011 
  (0.29)  (0.53)  (0.17)  0.42
Constant 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.012 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 
 (0.13) (0.29) (0.41) (0.66) (0.37) (0.39) (0.44) (0.61)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes: Δ ln(y) is the change in log real output. SoΔ  is the change in outsourcing. D is the time 
dummy. When time dummy equals to one, it means the time period in 1983-1987. Regressions without 
time dummy are estimated by using cross-section and time-series model with random effects. Numbers 
in parentheses are the absolute values t statistics. All dependent and independent variables are 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning and ending 
year.     
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4.4.3 Years of Completed Education 
According to table 20, the average year of completed education of blue collar 
workers was decreased by outsourcing in the 1980s. The facts behind the results could 
be that unskilled workers with higher education left high outsourcing industries or the 
unskilled labor with more years of completed education would like to work in low 
outsourcing industries. If young people have a higher education level than old people do, 
those results are also consistent with the increasing average ages in table 3. The other 
thinking is that the quality of workers can help us to realize whether the outsourcing 
enterprise hire better workers. Table 20 shows that outsourcing also could increase 
white-collar workers’ average years of completed education of outsourcing firms if the 
narrow definition of R&D workers is employed. After increasing the relative wage of 
white-collar workers, high outsourcing industries hire more educated skilled labor 
compared to low outsourcing industries.  
 
Table 20. Changes in Workers’ Average Years of Completed Education  
 Blue-Collar Skilled White-Collar 
(Broad Definition in R&D)
White-Collar 
(Narrow Definition in R&D)
SoΔ  -5.196 -24.970 1.376 1.575 1.261 1.548 1.572 1.776 
 (3.07) (7.44) (1.36) (1.56) (1.16) (1.44) (1.60) (1.81)
Δ ln(y) 0.147 -0.500 0.245 0.153 0.207 0.077 0.234 0.140 
 (0.67) (0.83) (1.39) (0.84) (1.10) (0.40) (1.37) (0.79) 
D   0.885  0.226  0.321  0.231 
  (2.08)  (1.76)  (2.36)  (1.86)
Constant -2.861 -2.492 0.151 0.046 0.159 0.008 0.144 0.036 
 (8.88) (8.42) (2.26) (0.51) (2.22) (0.09) (2.22) (0.42)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes: Δ ln(y) is the change in log real output. SoΔ  is the change in outsourcing. D is the time 
dummy. When time dummy equals to one, it means the time period in 1983-1987. Regressions without 
time dummy are estimated by using cross-section and time-series model with random effects. Numbers 
in parentheses are the absolute values t statistics. All dependent and independent variables are 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning and ending year.
  
 
Thus, according to the results in table 18 and 20, the inflows of high outsourcing 
industries were some skilled laborers with more years of age and completed education 
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and the outflows from them were older unskilled labor with fewer years of completed 
education. Also, according to table 1, high outsourcing industries did not hire more 
skilled workers than low outsourcing industries. Therefore, the outflows of skilled labor 
from high outsourcing industries to low outsourcing industries were considerable. Some 
skilled labor with fewer years of education could be laid off by high outsourcing 
industries and were hired by low outsourcing industries. After knowing the regression 
estimates of job retention rate, one realizes that the outflows of skilled labor from high to 
low outsourcing industries were the original workers or new hires.     
 
4.4.4 Job Stability 
I use a 4 years historical job retention rate to measure the job stability of 
manufacturing workers. The reason that I do not use a cross-sectional retention rate is 
because of the focus of this paper, the change of outsourcing. I want to see the impact of 
the change of outsourcing on the job retention rates and the change can only be seen 
though historical comparison. The way I compute retention rate follows Ureta (1992) 
and Diebold, et al. (1997). The 4-year retention rate is calculated as a ratio of the 
numbers of workers with at least four years tenure in the ending year in the total number 
of workers to the beginning year. Formally,  
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where ijR  is estimated 4-year retention rate for i  kind of workers in j  industry. 
( )tN ij  is number of employment of i  kind of workers in j  industry of t  year CPS 
tenure supplement. ( )4+tN ij  is number of employment of i  kind of workers in j  
industry of 4+t  year CPS tenure supplement. These retention rates need to be adjusted 
before comparing them across years.  
For adjusting the estimated retention rates, I decompose the estimated retention 
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rates into the part that I can adjust and the part can not be adjusted. The decomposed 
estimated job retention rate is  
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where ( )4+tM  is the total number of employment in manufacturing industries of t 
year CPS tenure supplement; )(tst j  is the share of total employment of  j  industry in 
t year ; )(tsl ij  is the share of the i  kind of workers in j  industry in t  year; 
( )4+tsvij  is the 4 years survival rate of the i  kind of workers in j  industry  in t+4 
year. The 4 years survival rate is the ratio of the workers with at least 4 years tenure in 
total number of employment in t+4 year in total number of employment in t year. ( )tp  
is the probability of being chosen as a respondent in year t; ( )tqij  is the biased 
probability of being chosen as a respondent i  kind of workers in  j industry in t year 
CPS tenure supplement.  
Since CPS chooses respondent randomly and their procedure is similar in each 
year, I assume ( )tp  are the same across years. ( )tqij  can vary across years and it make 
the draw seem not random. To obtain a comparison basing on the same sample sizes, I 
adjust the estimated retention rate by multiplying an inverse ratio of total number of 
employment in manufacturing industries of t year CPS tenure supplement in total 
number of employment in manufacturing industries of t+4 year CPS tenure supplement. 
Thus the adjusted 4-year retention rate is  
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Output and outsourcing can have effects on both )4()4( +×+ tsltst ijj  and ( )4+tsvij . I 
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expect to see a positive effect of output on both of them. The impacts from outsourcing 
on survival rate of each kind of workers may be different.  
As for R&D workers, their retention rates are difficult to determine in the 
following two cases. First, no R&D workers can be found in the beginning year, but 
there are some R&D laborers in the ending year. Second, there are no R&D workers in 
both beginning year and ending year in some industries. In the first case, one of the 
factor that cause this problem is a large )4( +tM  and a very small )(tM , but I still 
need a number in retention rate before the adjustment of different sample size. To get an 
acceptable number, I need to guess the number of R&D workers in the t year CPS tenure 
supplement. Assuming the reason why I can not find R&D workers in this industry is 
that there is a high ( )4+tq  and a very low ( )tq  which means that they are unlucky to 
be found. However, if there were more R&D workers in the beginning year, which is 
( )tN DRj &  bigger than ( )4& +tN DRj , they still should be easier to chosen to be 
respondents. The denominator should be bigger than the numerator. Therefore, the 
reasonable assumption is that the number of R&D workers in the beginning year was the 
same as the one in the ending year. This study treats the industries in the second case as 
having a zero retention rate because the R&D workers in these industries might be minor 
or could be temporary.  
Table 21 illustrates that outsourcing is not harmful to the job stability of the 
different kinds of workers. The positive significant coefficients of blue-collar workers 
tell us that the most likely reason for higher age and lower education is because the 
outsourcing firms retained the original workers and did not recruit new young workers. 
For increasing output, employers need to increase labor demand which leads to increased 
job stability among both unskilled and skilled laborers. It also can be seen after 
comparing the coefficients that R&D workers benefit the most, and white-collar workers 
and blue-collar the least from outsourcing. These results are consistent with the finding 
of Hsu (2006) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996).    
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Table 21. Changes in Laborers’ Retention Rates : 1983-1991 
 
 
Blue-Collar 
Workers 
 
Skilled Workers White-Collar 
Workers (Broad 
Definition)  
 
White-Collar 
Workers  
(Narrow Definition)
R&D Workers 
(Broad Definition)
R&D Workers 
(Narrow Definition)
SoΔ  2.105 8.722 6.333 7.149 4.781 9.643 4.164 10.061 9.966 11.989 12.194 18.534 
 (2.16) (5.60) (1.39) (3.20) (3.41) (5.77) (2.99) (5.87) (2.99) (3.54) (4.06) (5.77)
Δ ln(y) 0.479 0.794 0.242 0.320 0.605 0.872 0.524 0.811 0.856 0.797 0.907 1.415 
 (3.68) (2.83) (2.74) (1.80) (2.74) (2.89) (2.66) (2.63) (1.56) (1.56) (1.98) (2.45)
D   -0.383  -0.198  -0.393  -0.360  0.133  -0.429 
  (1.96)  (1.63)  (1.87)  (1.67)  (0.31)  (1.06)
Constant 1.233 1.142 3.853 2.311 3.853 1.244 1.314 1.240 1.288 1.159 0.772 0.682 
 (8.69) (8.38) (4.06) (2.68) (4.06) (8.50) (8.67) (8.26) (5.30) (3.91) (2.93) (2.43)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes: Δ ln(y) is the change in log real output. SoΔ  is the change in outsourcing. D is the time dummy. When time dummy equals to one, it means the 
time period in 1983-1987.Dependent variables are workers’ 4 years retention rates during 1983-1987 and 1987-1991. All dependent and independent 
variables are weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning and ending year. Regressions without time dummy 
are estimated by using cross-section and time-series model with random effects. Numbers in parentheses are the absolute values t statistics.    
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4.4.5 Average Tenure  
Table 22 shows the results of regressions of average tenure. Although 
outsourcing increases the average tenure, those effects are not statistically significant. 
Real output also has an insignificant positive coefficient. These results do not mean that 
there is no effect of outsourcing and real output on job tenure. The positive effect could 
be weakened when summarizing all workers’ tenure together. Checking the change of 
retention rate can clarify the effects.  
Basing on the results in table 21 and 22, the insignificant coefficients also 
illustrate that the inflows and outflows of employment were very frequent in both high 
and low outsourcing industries. Although outsourcing causes some inflows and outflows 
of employment across industries and, so far the results in table 18, 19, and 20 support 
this idea, those flows might be just one direction.35  
 
Table 22. Changes in Workers’ Average Tenure Years 
 Blue-Collar Skilled White-Collar 
(Broad Definition in R&D)
White-Collar 
(Narrow Definition in R&D)
SoΔ  4.784 5.219 5.044 5.096 1.178 1.026 4.617 4.432 
 (1.54) (1.67) (1.35) (1.36) (0.29) (0.25) (1.22) (1.16)
Δ ln(y) 0.280 0.081 -0.531 -0.555 0.863 0.932 -0.225 -0.140 
 (0.52) (0.14) (0.82) (0.82) (1.23) (1.27) (0.34) (0.20)
D   0.005  0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
  (1.25)  (0.12)  (0.33)  -0.43
Constant 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.32) (0.6) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) (0.11) (0.43) (0.03)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
Notes:Δ ln(y) is the change in log real output. SoΔ  is the change in outsourcing. D is the time 
dummy. When time dummy equals to one, it means the time period in 1983-1987. Regressions without 
time dummy are estimated by using cross-section and time-series model with random effects. Numbers 
in parentheses are the absolute values t statistics. All dependent and independent variables are 
weighted by average industry share of all manufacturing employment in the beginning and ending 
year.     
  
The results in table 22, however, tell us that those flows went in two directions. 
                                                 
35 Here I only consider the case under full employment. If unemployment is also considered, it is difficult 
to use the results in table 7 to show the direction of flow of employment. 
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The reason is that if just high outsourcing industries outflow or inflow employment, high 
outsourcing industries should have significant higher or lower average tenure than low 
outsourcing industries. The insignificant results in table 22 indicate two directions flows 
of employment between high and low outsourcing industries in the 1980s.       
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks  
Although the debate of whether outsourcing contributes to wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled labor in the U.S. during the 1980s had been settled by 
previous theoretical and empirical studies. There are other issues which are also 
important but have been ignored. Laborers’ job tenure could be affected by outsourcing. 
Also, the influences of outsourcing on inflow and outflow of labor between the 
industries that highly outsource their production and industries that do not focus on 
outsourcing is important. Workers with different demographic characteristics like 
average age, years of completed education, and gender may face different changes in 
their labor demand.  
In this study, following Ureta (1992) and Diebold, et al. (1997), I employ Current 
Population Survey (CPS) data to discuss the impact of outsourcing on the changes of 
workers’ demographic characteristics and job retention rates in the American 
manufacturing industries during the 1980s. Estimating outsourcing follows Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996) by employing the ratio of estimated imports of intermediate inputs in the 
total purchase of non-energy material. Also, this paper separates skilled labor into 
white-collar workers who work in manufacturing, and R&D workers who conduct 
innovation of new products by two definitions of R&D workers.  
This study finds that outsourcing decreases blue-collar laborers’ average years of 
completed education; increased the hiring of women in white-collar jobs, and increased 
job stability of both unskilled and skilled laborers. Thus, outsourcing does not take away 
unskilled laborers’ jobs but hinders new hiring of young unskilled workers. This study 
can be seen as a welfare check of the impact of outsourcing on laborers. 
As for the inflows and outflows between high and low outsourcing industries, the 
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results of average years of tenure also illustrate that the inflows and outflows of 
employment were very frequent in both high and low outsourcing industries. The 
employment flows between high and low outsourcing were two directions in the 1980s. 
On the one hand, the inflows of employment in high outsourcing industries were some 
skilled laborers with more years of age and completed education. The outflows of 
employment in high outsourcing industries were unskilled labor with more years of age 
and less years of completed education, and some skilled labor with fewer years of 
education. On the other hand, those inflows and outflows of employment in high 
outsourcing industries were also the outflows and inflows of employment in low 
outsourcing industries.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
115
CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The argument of whether outsourcing causes wage deterioration for unskilled labor 
has been much supported by the new evidence proposed by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1996;1999). In their papers, outsourcing can explain 30.9% of the increase in the 
non-production wage share and 15% of the increase in the relative wage of 
non-production workers from 1979 to 1990. The empirical results of 1972-1979, 
however, are completely different from those for 1979-1990 and seem to contradict the 
concepts of the outsourcing theory.  
In my dissertation, first, a dynamic product cycle model with three kinds of labor 
inputs, scientists, white-collar workers, and blue-collar workers, is constructed.  It is 
shown that only scientists unambiguously benefit from outsourcing. Other skilled 
laborers are hurt by outsourcing. After relaxing the assumption of homogenous 
producers, if outsourcing industries, compared to non-outsourcing industries, are 
absolutely white-collar-intensive, an increase in the outsourcing fraction will raise the 
relative wage of white-collar workers. If outsourcing industries, compared to 
non-outsourcing industries are absolutely blue-collar-intensive, an increase in the 
outsourcing fraction will decrease the relative wage of white-collar workers. 
The wage level of white-collar laborers can be increased by outsourcing if the total 
effect of the skilled effect and the scale effect dominates the substitution effect, and the 
cost reduction caused by outsourcing is sufficient. The wage level of blue-collar workers 
may rise after an increase in outsourcing if outsourcing industries, compared to 
non-outsourcing industries are absolutely blue-collar-intensive. 
Second, by borrowing the framework of international fragmentation from Jones 
and Kierzkowski (2001) and Jones (2005), Chapter III finds that the change in the 
skilled/unskilled labor ratio of the outsourcing industry is a possible explanation for the 
outsourcing puzzle in the 1970s. If the outsourcing industry is relatively 
skilled-labor-intensive compared to the non-outsourcing industry, the relative wage of 
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skilled labor increases, but if the outsourcing industry is relatively 
unskilled-labor-intensive, the relative wage of skilled labor decreases.  
By employing the NBER Productivity Database and March CPS data to construct a 
new data set with three kinds of labor and regression estimation to check the influence of 
structural variables, including outsourcing on workers’ wages, I find that R&D workers 
always benefit from outsourcing. The relative wage of white-collar workers was 
increasing because of outsourcing in the 1980s, but decreasing in the 1970s. The falling 
relative wage of white-collar workers in the 1970s was caused by the decreasing wages 
of white-collar workers.  
Although the debate of whether outsourcing contributes to wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled labor in the U.S. during the 1980s had been settled by 
previous theoretical and empirical studies. There are other issues which are also 
important but have been ignored. Laborers’ job tenure could be affected by outsourcing. 
Also, the influences of outsourcing on inflow and outflow of labor between the 
industries that highly outsource their production and industries that do not focus on 
outsourcing is important. Workers with different demographic characteristics like 
average age, years of completed education, and gender may face different changes in 
their labor demand.  
In the chapter IV of my dissertation, following Ureta (1992) and Diebold, et al. 
(1997), I employ Current Population Survey (CPS) data to discuss the impact of 
outsourcing on the changes of workers’ demographic characteristics and job retention 
rates in the American manufacturing industries during the 1980s. Estimating outsourcing 
follows Feenstra and Hanson (1996) by employing the ratio of estimated imports of 
intermediate inputs in the total purchase of non-energy material. Also, this paper separates 
skilled labor into white-collar workers who work in manufacturing, and R&D workers 
who conduct innovation of new products by two definitions of R&D workers.  
I find that outsourcing decreases blue-collar laborers’ average years of completed 
education; increased the hiring of women in white-collar jobs, and increased job stability 
of both unskilled and skilled laborers. Thus, outsourcing does not take away unskilled 
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laborers’ jobs but hinders new hiring of young unskilled workers. This study can be seen 
as a welfare check of the impact of outsourcing on laborers. 
As for the inflows and outflows between high and low outsourcing industries, the 
results of average years of tenure also illustrate that the inflows and outflows of 
employment were very frequent in both high and low outsourcing industries. The 
employment flows between high and low outsourcing were two directions in the 1980s. 
On the one hand, the inflows of employment in high outsourcing industries were some 
skilled laborers with more years of age and completed education. The outflows of 
employment in high outsourcing industries were unskilled labor with more years of age 
and less years of completed education, and some skilled labor with fewer years of 
education. On the other hand, those inflows and outflows of employment in high 
outsourcing industries were also the outflows and inflows of employment in low 
outsourcing industries. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1. NN wwE ∂∂ )( & α∂∂ )( NwE  
( )NWNBNBNW
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N
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11);( −
−= δα . 
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11212
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N
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N
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'
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'
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N
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N
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aaaaaaaaaLaL
−
−−+−
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By assuming NWNW aa '2
'
1 =  and NBNB aa '2'1 = , it becomes 
 
 
=
( )( ) ( )( )
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1
'
1
'
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1
'
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N
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N
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−
−−+−−
 
=
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )21212
12121
'
1
'
NWNBNBNW
NWNWB
N
NBNBW
N
NWNBNBNW
aaaa
aaLaaLaaaa
−
−−−−
. 
 
Thus,  
if NBNB aa 12 >  and, NWNW aa 12 < then Nw
E
∂
∂ < 0 
if NBNB aa 12 <  and NWNW aa 12 > then Nw
E
∂
∂ > 0  
 
α∂
∂E × ⎟⎠
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⎛
λ
2n = ( )( )( ) −−
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=
( )( )
( )21212
1
'
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'
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NWNBNBNW
NWNBNBNWNWB
N
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N
aaaa
aaaaaLaL
−
−−
. 
 
Therefore, α∂
∂E  depends on whether ( )NWBNNBWN aLaL 22 −  is positive or not. 
 
 
A.2. Nw∂∂κ & ακ ∂∂  
B
N
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N
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N
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N
NW LaLaLaLa 1122 −−=κ  
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LaLaLaLaLaLaLaLa
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Since I assume NWNW aa '2
'
1 =  and NBNB aa '2'1 = , Nw∂
∂κ becomes 
=
( ) ( )( )( )
( )211
''
2112
B
N
NWW
N
NB
B
N
NWW
N
NBB
N
NWNWW
N
NBNB
LaLa
LaLaLaaLaa
−
−−+−
. 
Thus,  
if NBNB aa 12 >  and, NWNW aa 12 < then Nw∂
∂κ > 0 and Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 > 0 
if NBNB aa 12 <  and NWNW aa 12 > then Nw∂
∂κ < 0 and Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 < 0 
 
α∂
∂k = ( )( )( )211
'
1
'
122
B
N
NWW
N
NB
W
N
NBB
N
NWNBW
N
NWB
N
LaLa
LaLaaLaL
−
−−
. 
Therefore, α∂
∂k  depends on whether ( )NBWNNWBN aLaL 22 −  is positive or negative.  
E is positive, and by equation (41), k is positive. If NBNB aa 12 <  and NWNW aa 12 > , the 
denominator of E is positive, which means the numerator of E has to be positive. That is, 
( )BNNWWNNB LaLa 11 −  is positive. Since the numerator of E is also the denominator of k, 
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( )NBWNNWBN aLaL 22 −  has to be positive. On the contrary, if NBNB aa 12 >  and NWNW aa 12 < , 
( )NBWNNWBN aLaL 22 −  is negative. In sum, if NBNB aa 12 >  and, NWNW aa 12 < , then NwE∂∂ < 0, 
Nw∂
∂κ >0, Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 >0, α∂
∂k < 0, and α∂
∂E > 0. If NBNB aa 12 <  and NWNW aa 12 > , then Nw
E
∂
∂ > 
0, Nw∂
∂κ <0, Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 <0, α∂
∂k > 0, and α∂
∂E < 0. 
 
 
A.3. Nw∂∂κ + ακ ∂∂  
Suppose α∂
∂ NWa = - N
NW
w
a
∂
∂  and α∂
∂ NBa = - N
NB
w
a
∂
∂  
 Nw
k
∂
∂ + α∂
∂k = ( )( )( )211
''
11
B
N
NWW
N
NB
W
N
NBB
N
NWNBW
N
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N
LaLa
LaLaaLaL
−
−−
, which is positive if  NBNB aa 12 >  
and, NWNW aa 12 < . 
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APPENDIX B  
(SW and SB) 
 
[ ]EnnaL SOWSWS += δα                
  
=
( )( )E
R
rnaWS
1
121 τδαφ +−  
where 1R = ( )[ ]μφφμ ++ 1r  & ( )NWNBNBNW
NWB
N
NBW
NN
aaaan
aLaLwE
12122
11)( −
−= δ . 
Let 
( )E
R
r
1
1 μδαη +=  
Nw∂∂η =
( ) ( )( )
2
1
1
11
1
1
R
w
rEr
w
Er
w
rER NNN ∂
∂++−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂++∂
∂ μδαμφμδααδ
 
=
( ) ( )[ ]
2
1
1
11
R
w
rE
w
ErR NN ∂
∂−+−∂
∂+ μδαφμφμδα
. 
Since δαφ  is a small number, the result tells us that Nw∂∂η depends on both 
Nw
E
∂
∂  and Nw
r
∂
∂ 1 . 
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APPENDIX C 
(H1 and H2) 
Both WNw  and 
Hw  are positive and greater than zero. From equation (46), one 
can get WNw = ( ) ( ) *2* 2
*
2
*
*
N
r
H
r ACE
aw
a
E
δ
ργ
ργ
+
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+ , which gives us a condition is as follows:  
( )
1*
2
*
<+
E
aw rH ργ . Plugging WNw  into equation (45) yields 
 Hw = ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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H
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r
r
ON
r wa
E
AC
a
arr
ACACr
ar
E
2
*
*
*
2
2
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
*
1
1
*
1
*
ργ
ργ
φρρτ
φρτ
φρ
ω > 0, 
( )
*
2
*
E
aw rH ργ + = 
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) r
r
N
ON
r
r
N
ON
r
r
arr
a
AC
ACACr
arr
a
AC
ACACr
ar
a
1
*
1
*
1
2
*
*
2
*
1
*
1
*
1
1
*
1
*
1
2
*
*
2
*
1
*
1
*
1
1
*
1
2
*
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ωργ
++++
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=
2
1
2
1
2
1
1 S
S
S
S
I
I
−
−
,  
where 1I  and 2I  are the intersections of H1 and H2 and 1S  and 2S  are the absolute 
values of slopes of H1 and H2. For satisfying the condition that WNw  and 
Hw  are both 
positive, the following condition need to hold, 0<
( )
*
2
*
E
aw rH ργ + < 1. Therefore, when 
2
1
S
S > 1, then 
2
1
S
S >
2
1
I
I > 1, which means that both the slope and the intercept of 
H1 are larger than H2’s. When 
2
1
S
S <1, then 
2
1
S
S <
2
1
I
I <1, which means that both 
the slope and the intercept of H1 are smaller than H2’s.  
 
  
125
APPENDIX D 
(Comparative Statics of Increasingα  on Hw and WNw ) 
 
H1 and H2 can be restated as: 
 
H1:    Hw + WNw 1S - 1I = 0 
H2:    Hw + WNw 2S - 2I = 0, 
where 1S is the slope of H1. 2S is the slope of H2. 1I is the intersection of H1. 2I is the 
intersection of H2. Total differentiating H1 & H2 with Hw , WNw ,α , Nw  gets: 
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Using Jacobian matrix to express the equations above is: 
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where 
wHH1 = Hw
H
∂
∂ 1 =1, 
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∂
∂ 2 =1, 
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∂
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= ( ) rar ACE 11 1φρ
δ
++ , where 1AC = ( )τφα ,,;, 11 rwAC N  and 1 1r
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α
1I = α∂
∂ 1I =
( )
( ) 2121
1
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r
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rEaEar
φρ
ααφρ
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∂
∂−∂
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,37 
 
α
2I = α∂
∂ 2I =
( )
( ) 2222
1
1
2
222
r
rr
ar
r
r
rEaEar
+
∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂+
ρ
ααρ
, 
 
                                                 
36The effect of an increase in Nw on NjAC is uncertain since hiring more workers whose wages become 
cheaper could still not decrease their unit cost. Therefore, for simplification, I assume there is no effect of 
Nw  on jAC  in both Northern and Outsourcing Firms. 
37 Since ω doesn’t affect our analysis, I assume its value to be a constant and ignore it. 
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wNI1 = Nw
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∂ 1 =
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ρ
. 
 
Since 1S > 2S , Δ= wHH1 wWH 2 - wHH 2 wWH1 <0. 
 
By employing cramer’s rule, it can be known: 
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221112 SwISSwIS
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Total effect on Hw is equal to the sum of αd
dwH  and N
H
dw
dw , which is 
αd
dwH + N
H
dw
dw = ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]Δ− +−+−+−+
wNW
N
wNwNW
N
wN SSwIISSSwIIS 1111222221
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,  
and total effect on WNw is equal to the sum of αd
dwWN  and N
W
N
dw
dw
, which is 
αd
dwWN + N
W
N
dw
dw
=
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
Δ−
+−+−+−+ wNWNwNwNWNwN SSwIISSwII 22221111 αααα . 
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By assuming 1AC =
NAC2 = AC for clear analysis, 
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. 
 
Since H1 has longer intersection than H2, ( ) ( ) rr arar 1122 φρρ ++−+ is always larger 
than zero. So, a positive WNw  requires: 1. ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
Nw
EE
α is positive and larger enough, 
and 2. The unit cost of the Outsourcing Firm has been reduced enough by increasing the 
outsourcing fraction so that makes the equation above become positive. I refer to this 
requirement as condition WNw .  
 
By the same method, ( ) ( )[ ]wNWNwN SSwIIS 22221 +−+ αα  ( ) ( )[ ]wNWNwN SSwIIS 11112 +−+− αα  
can be calculated as 
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. 
 
By equations (45) and (46), it can be seen that ( ) ( ) rr arSarS 222111 +−++ ρφρ equals to 
zero. The value of ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
Nw
EE
α cannot affect the result of αd
dwH + N
H
dw
dw .    
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